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There is a Soviet naval operational art. It is real. The
Soviets are in deadly earnest about it. They theorize about
naval warfare in terms of the application of naval operational
art to the successful completion of naval operations. They will
plan naval strategic operations in accordance with that art and
execute the planned operations to achieve strategic objectives in
vast geographical areas of strategic importance to them called
TVDs (Theaters of Strategic Military Action). 1
As military pedants, the Soviets have established an
extraordinarily coherent grammar of armed warfare. 2
Systematically and with claims of "scientific" rigor, the Soviets
designate Naval Operational Art as part of Soviet Military
Operational Art and bind the navy with its general principles.
For the Soviets the general principles of Military Operational
Art are identical with the general principles of Naval
Operational Art. As Russians and survivors of a tough historical
past of revolution and war, the Soviets reluctantly have begun to
wrestle with the special features inherent in naval warfare.
1TVD is the Soviet acronym for teatr vovennvKh devstviv or
theater of strategic military action (TSMA)
.
2The Soviets, for example, use the term, armed warfare, in
pedantic distinction to other warfare conducted in most spheres
of social interaction without the firing of weapons.
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During the past approximate eight years with the shift toward
emphasis on extended conventional warfare, Soviet naval writers
have characterized naval operations in various ways in terms of
processes (e.g., reconnaissance, strike, command and control) and
features (oceanic terrains) that have clarified significantly the
principles of naval operational art.
The Soviets claim a mastery of military operational art
based on their success in The Great Fatherland War and the
application of the Marxist-Leninist historical and scientific
dialectic (logic) to military science, doctrine, and art in the
post-war period. They claim operational superiority over the
Germans in the Second World War and similar superiority over the
armed forces of the bourgeois, capitalist states arrayed against
them at present. With compelling historical argument, the
Soviets claim that the Napoleonic revolution in warfare, and, in
particular, the advent of mass armies (armed forces) , obviated
any single battle from achieving the strategic objective of a
war. Soviet military theoreticians note that the Napoleonic
revolution demanded a new form of war fighting activity described
as the military operation. For the Soviets, of course, the term
military operation does not have the same more or less generic
meaning of military combat activity that is common in the West.
For the Soviets, the military operation is the combat carried out
in a given time and place to achieve unified strategic objectives
and consisting necessarily of two or more battles (engagements,
or strikes and accompanying maneuver) requiring the application
1-2
of operational art for direction and coordination. This mini-
definition of the Soviet military operation shows rather neatly
the pedantry associated with Soviet military theory. For the
Soviets, a battle is a battle — combat carried out by tactical
formations according to tactical principles and having the
purpose to accomplish tactical missions, the most important of
which are set by operational art. A ground battle conducted by a
Soviet army division is not to be confused with an operation
coordinated by an operational level front or independent army
headquarters. Similarly, a naval strike conducted by a formation
including first rank surface ships is not to be confused with a
naval operation coordinated by an operational level fleet
headquarters
.
With relation to naval warfare, the Soviets note that naval
art had produced by the beginning of the First World War, "a new
form of fleet combat activity — the naval operation [italics in
original] — which created the need for appropriate measures for
its support." 3 Imperial Russian naval thinkers and later Soviets
linked larger navies and diverse higher performance naval weapons
with a revolution in naval warfare demanding the coordinated
naval operation in place of the previous brief, simple, surface
ship engagement. With considerable systematic rigor, the Soviets
created operational art to string together the battles,
30ffice of Naval Intelligence, Soviet Military Encyclopedia.
Selected Translations of Naval Interest . Collection I, January
1983, alphabetical entry: Naval Art. This publication herein-
after cited as ONI, SME . Naval .
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encounters, engagements, actions, strikes, and maneuvers of the
tactical formations into operations. The Soviets note, for
example, that the operational art of each service of the armed
forces proceeds in its development from the general principles of
operational art with regard for the specific nature of the
organizations, technical outfitting, sphere of operation, combat
capabilities, and methods of combat employment of each service. 4
The Soviets insist that the Navy is bound by the general
principles of operational art while simultaneously demanding the
"imaginative application" of the general principles to the
specific situations unique to the naval operation.
The Soviet naval operation is the most important key to the
understanding of Soviet naval operational art. The modern naval
operation exists in terms of wartime historical example and
peacetime exercise, and in the Soviet navy, is orchestrated by a
system of planning and execution described as naval operational
art. The Soviets leave little doubt about the general form of
orchestration stating that:
Naval Operational Art (Operativnoye Iskusstvo) encompasses
theory and practice of preparation for and conduct of
integrated fleet, naval, and amphibious landing operations,
antiamphibious operations, and employment of naval forces in
combined arms, joint, as well as independent operations. 5
4ONI, SME . Naval, I, Naval Art.
5Soviet Union, Military Affairs, Military Encyclopedia
Dictionary . Volume VI, 17 August 1987, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, JPRS-UMA-87-011-L, alphabetical entry,
Naval Operational Art. This publication hereinafter cited as
Soviet Union, MED . *
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In effect, the Soviet naval operation is naval operational art.
With some originality, a naval officer at the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School has hypothesized that Soviet naval
operational art is the Soviet military skill of preparing and
executing the plan for the naval operation. The officer
suggests that the plan neither creates strategic goals nor
engages in combat but serves as a link between strategy and
tactics. 6 As such, the plan is necessarily the operation whose
substance is the tactical combat orchestrated by the plan.
The Soviets leave little doubt that the naval operation is
the sum total of its tactical combat activity. One Soviet
authority notes, for example, that even before the Second World
War his country had defined with sufficient completeness,
...the content of an operation as the aggregate of battles,
actions, strikes, and maneuvers of mixed forces [e.g., naval
surface ships, submarines, and naval aviation] coordinated and
interrelated by objective, missions, place, and time and
conducted under a single concept and plan....'
In discussing the revolution in modern war brought about by the
mass armies of the French Revolution and the decisive war
fighting style of Napoleon, other Soviet authorities echo the
same description noting that,
...in military art a new category was conceived—the operation
as an aggregate of a number of engagements and encounters by
one or several army groupings [i.e., front ( s) , or in the navy,
6
David J. Kern, Soviet Naval Operational Art , Naval Postgradute School
Master's Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgradute School, June 1988).
7Captain 1st Rank G. Ammon, Doctor of Historical Sciences,
"Characteristic Features of Naval Operational Art in the First
Period of the Great Patriotic War," Morskov Sbornik . No. 2,
1985, p. 22.
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fleet (s) ] , unified by a single concept and conducted on a
broad front for several days. 8
Putting these two representative descriptions together, we see
that the naval operation is the aggregate of tactical combat,
e.g., battles, strikes, engagements, and maneuvers, orchestrated
by naval operational art to achieve strategic goals.
Soviet descriptions of military operations and operational
art such as those recounted above allow us to put together a
dictionary style definition of Soviet naval operational art.
The limited usefulness of a definition, particularly at this
early stage of the description of naval operational art, should
be apparent. The definition will be largely a collection of
words fraught with ambiguity, and triggering images of the
translated Russian words that fit comfortably with a Western
outlook. A definition is a fundamental beginning, however, and
the following one is suggested as an initial measure of Soviet
naval operational art. Given the considerable importance of
operational art in potential future Soviet war fighting, it is
suggested that the definition be included in future versions of
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number One, Dictionary of
Military Terms : 9
Soviet Naval Operational Art (Sovetskoye Operativnoye
Iskusstvo ) is based on the theory that the revolution in modern
8ONI, SME, Naval, I, Battle (Bitya)
.
9See, for example, Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, Doctor of Naval
Science, Professor, "Some Issues of the Theory of the
Development and Employment of the Navy," Morskov Sbornik . No. 4,
1981, p. 19.
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war resulting from the appearance of the mass conscript armies
of the Napoleonic period created a situation in which a single
combat engagement could no longer achieve victory in a war or
campaign. In the navy, the one-time, surface ship engagement
was replaced by the Imperial Russian and later Soviet naval
operation in which large numbers of diverse naval weapons and
platforms engaged in multiple engagements over extended periods
of time to achieve strategic goals previously often achieved in
a brief, single battle. Soviet Naval Operational Art is the
theory and practice of the preparation for and conduct of
integrated multiple tactical engagements, strikes, and maneuvers
comprising the modern fleet, other naval, and amphibious and
antiamphibious operations. These operations are conducted
according to a unified military strategy to achieve Soviet
strategic goals in geographical theaters of strategic military
action.
Armed at least with the words of a dictionary-style
definition of Soviet naval operational art, we should be able to
begin to ask the right questions about the phenomenon. One
question that comes to mind is: just what are the factors
associated with the art that can be systematically broken out
and examined to piece together an accurate and useful picture?
By examining the following key words in the definition, we can
begin to see the factors that make up Soviet naval operational
art:
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Soviet Naval Operational Art:






























The Soviets use the modern naval operation to achieve
strategic goals. If Soviet naval operational art orchestrates
the naval operations, it follows that the art has conceptualized
strategic missions for naval forces in order to achieve
strategic goals. The Soviets with characteristic pedantic
firmness lay out the following strategic missions for naval
forces to accomplish in the naval operation. The standard list
includes the following seven strategic missions for naval
forces: 10
1. Disrupt Enemy Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)





Defeat Enemy Naval Forces in Closed and Open Seas and
Ocean Areas Contiguous with Coasts
Destroy Enemy Land Targets
Destroy Enemy Carrier Groupings (Anticarrier Warfare, ACW)
Destroy Enemy Antisubmarine Forces (Anti-Antisubmarine
Warfare, A-ASW)
Destroy Enemy Missile Submarines.
10
See in Soviet Union, MED, V, pp. 1910, 1911
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The list is revealing. The missions track strictly
alongside of the perceived enemy threat and therefore seem to be
cast defensively. The list does not include amphibious and
antiamphibious missions, suggesting a doctrinal subordination of
the navy to the army in landing and antilanding operations.
Given the extreme centralization of planning and control in the
Soviet armed forces, the list can be taken to be binding on the
Soviet navy allowing Western military planners to anticipate
that Soviet naval forces will be conducting naval operations
strictly in the mission categories noted.
The Soviets characteristically theorize about the character
and course of armed warfare including the part described as
military art. Within such a framework of intense theorization,
one Soviet authority has described seven principles of military
art existing in the contemporary (1972 publication) world. 11
The Soviet authority associates the principles with
scientifically derived laws of war and claims that the Soviet
principles are superior in scientific rigor and systematic logic
to those of the U.S., British, and French armed forces. The
authority, Colonel V. Ye. Savkin, lists the following:
11V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and
Tactics (A Soviet View ) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), see especially Chapter 3 and p. 165.
The work was translated from the Russian under the auspices of
the U.S. Air Force.
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Seven Soviet Principles of Military Art
1. Mobility and High Tempo of Combat Operations
2
.
Superiority in Forces and Means on the Main Axis of
Operations
3. Surprise
4 Energy in Combat
5. Preservation of Combat Effectiveness of Friendly Forces
6. Conformity of Goal and Plans of the Military Operation
to the Actual Situation
7. Coordination.
The Soviets apply these principles to the naval operation
and the associated practice of naval operational art. The
principles are taken seriously by them and provide a means for
understanding the Soviet way in both ground and naval warfare
and the many possible combined operations that can be executed
by the five branches of the Soviet armed forces and their combat
and supporting arms. Surprisingly, with the centralization of
military theory in the Soviet Union, one important naval
authority recently discussed principles of naval art "under
today's conditions" and the principles are somewhat different
not only in number but also in type (quality) of action. 12 The
explanation for such a situation is probably that the naval
authority, Admiral V. Chernavin, presently commander in chief of
the Soviet navy, is attempting to emphasize the most important
principles and particularly those which may be assuming greater
12See in V. Chernavin, "Regarding Several Categories of
Naval Art Under Contemporary Conditions," Morskov Sbornik . No.
9, 1986, pp. 28-33.
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importance under the impact of contemporary strategic and
technological change. Chernavin can be assumed to have the
authority and self-confidence to do so and discusses and
emphasizes the following principles of naval art: 13
Chernavin ' s Five Selected Principles of Naval Art
1. Combat Readiness (boevaia sposobnost M
2. Surprise fvnezapnost '
)




5. Massing (Particularly of Fires in Terms of Strikes)
(Massirovaniye)
.
The principles discussed by Chernavin are important for an
understanding of the Soviet naval operation, naval operational
art, and the Soviet style of warfare at sea. In breaking out
five principles of special importance to the practice of naval
operational art, Chernavin can be assumed inadvertently or
otherwise to have distinguished such art from military
operational art. It is difficult to imagine the principle of
concentration of forces and means along the main axis of advance
being missing from any list of more important principles.
Chernavin leaves it out of his discussion preferring instead to
include massing of fires. Both principles — concentration with
its ground-oriented modifiers and massing with its naval (and
nuclear) applications — can be seen to be part of a
fundamentally similar pattern of action. Chernavin, in effect,
13 Ibid.
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considers concentration extremely important and considers
massing of fires as the uniquely naval version of it.
The Soviets theorize that naval operational art conducts
both sequential and simultaneous tactical combat activity toward
the achievement of strategic missions and the securing of
strategic goals. They see the naval operation as the total of
the combat actions comprising the operation with a special
increased effect (synergism) due to skill in the application of
operational art. The Soviets find it necessary, therefore, to
distinguish between the single coordinated operation and the
operationally orchestrated combat actions comprising the war
fighting substance of that single coordinated operation. In
carefully structured, encyclopedic descriptions, the Soviets










The Soviets specifically delineate the operation as,
...the aggregate of battles, engagements, strikes and
maneuvers coordinated and interlinked in objective, tasks,
14See in, Captain 1st Rank G. Ammon, Doctor of Historical
Science, "Characteristic Features of Naval Operational Art in
the First Period of the Great Patriotic War," Morskov Sbornik .
No. 2, 1985, p. 22, where he notes the content of an operation
as "the aggregate of battles, actions, strikes, and maneuvers,"
with his "actions" being equatable with encounter and engagement.
1-12
place, and time, by various force organizations, conducted
simultaneously and sequentially according to a common concept
and plan to accomplish missions in a theater (theaters) of
[strategic military action) .. .within a specified period of
time. 15
For the Soviets, battles and encounters are comprised of
engagements and the word, engagement, signifies an organized
armed clash or combat. 16 The Soviets in turn define tactics as
the theory and practice of preparation for and conduct of an
engagement. 17 The end result is that all the words describing
combat in the Soviet military operation signify tactical combat
and associated tactics. Conventional Soviet battles and
encounters are comprised of tactical engagements and
conventional strikes, the latter being tactically oriented
deliveries of conventional ordnance, e.g., missile, torpedo, and
naval aviation weapon systems in the case of the navy. From
this we can derive the ultra-succinct definition of Soviet naval
operational art as the stringing together of tactical
engagements and strikes to achieve strategic goals.
The Soviets can move with agility from the higher reaches of
military strategy through tactical combat because of their
highly centralized, scientific, long-term theories of world
history. The Soviets note that naval operational art is
dialectically (i.e., logically) connected with military
15See in, Soviet Union, MED . VI, 1987, p. 2148.
16See in, ONI, SME . Naval, Collection III, entry:
engagement
.
17See in, Ibid., entry: Tactics.
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strategy. With impressive systematic rigor, they continue on to
define a single unified military strategy, denying the
possibility of a naval strategy while keeping in touch with
practical reality by the construction of an elaborate theory of
the navy. 18 Soviet naval operational art, the theory of the
navy, and military strategy are guided by the general principles
of Soviet military art and the particular theories of Soviet
naval art. In turn, the Soviets show military art guided by the
laws and regularities of military science and the immediate,
practical directives of Soviet military doctrine.
Figure One illustrates the centralization, unification, and
potential predictability of Soviet military strategy and naval
operational art. The figure shows the complete centralization
of political and military goals, the concept of a single
military strategy, and the implementation of it by realistic
naval operational art in appropriate oceanic and sea theaters of
strategic military action (TSMAs)
.
One Soviet military authority, V.G. Kulikov, in an
encyclopedia-style commentary on operational art, gives a
succinct description of the centralization of Soviet military
theory. Kulikov notes that operational art is a component of
military art and encompasses the theory and practice of
preparing for and conducting joint and independent operations by
18See the authoritative treatment in, Commander in Chief,
Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, S. Gorahkov,
"Questions of the Theory of the Navy," Morskov Sbornik . No. 7,
1983, especially pp. 29-34.
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Figure One. The Centralization, Unification, and Potential
Predictability of Soviet Military Strategy and
Naval Operational Art
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forces of the services of the Soviet armed forces. He places
operational art neatly between strategy and tactics by stating
that "the requirements and provisions of strategy are
fundamental for operational art, which in turn determines the
missions and directions of tactics." 19 Kulikov then establishes
the hierarchial location of operational art by stating that the
basic provisions of operational art stems from the principles of
military art. The main factors that determine the content and
development of Soviet operational and military art in turn are
the provisions and requirements of Soviet military science and
military doctrine. Figure One reflects Kulikov' s views
diagrammatically.




THE SOVIET NAVAL OPERATION:
EXPERIENCE OF THE GREAT FATHERLAND WAR
It is one thing to define Soviet naval operational art in
the style of the encyclopedia and dictionary but quite another to
piece together an understanding of it. The respected Prussian
philosopher of war, Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) , suggested
that the best lectures on war are war itself. 1 It is probably
not too much to suggest, therefore, that the best illustration of
Soviet naval operational art is naval operational art itself,
specifically the art as executed by the Soviets in war itself
—
nothing more, nothing less. For a continental power, Imperial
Russia and the Soviet Union present a particularly rich
experience in naval warfare. Observing the Russians from mid-
19th century onward, we have to be struck by the peripheral,
naval-influenced quality of their war fighting. The Russians
conducted campaigns and exercises in the "gray water" of the
Black Sea, and Turkish Straits (1840, 1853-56, 1877-78, 1914-17,
1941-45), the waters of the Yellow Sea (1895, 1904-05), and the
Baltic and Barents Seas (1914-17, 1941-45). They conducted a
dramatic long range "blue water" campaign in the projection of
their Baltic fleet to the Pacific in 1904-05. On balance though,
the Russians have had an incomplete experience of naval
II-l
campaigning. Compared, however, with the Prussians and Imperial
Germans, representing another great continental power, they had a
vast experience of naval warfare in the period 1840 through the
eve of the Great War. During that period and with the additional
experiences of the First and Second World Wars, they claim to
have come to grips with the revolution in modern war and to have
developed naval operational art. Surely naval operational art
exists somewhere there in terms of war itself.
The Soviets, in summarizing the experience of the past, note
that for centuries the encounter and the battle were the only
forms of naval warfare. As the means of "armed combat" expanded,
they note that "it was no longer possible for one engagement or
battle to smash the opposing enemy groupings and achieve the
objective of the war." 2 One Soviet authority claims that the
naval operation began taking definite shape during the Russo-
Japanese War (1904-05). 3 In looking for Soviet naval operational
art in terms of the ideal war fighting example, we should
probably cast the net to include the period from that conflict to
the Great Fatherland War. At this point we run into the question
of the soundness of applying anything out of the past to the
present. Given the fundamental, time-independent regularities
associated with human interaction, for example, in armed warfare,
we can probably get closer to an understanding of Soviet naval
2Admiral V. Sysoyev, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor,
"The Development of Forms of Naval Warfare," Morskov Sbornik . No.
11, 1980, pp, 24, 25.
3 Ibid.
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operational art by analyzing a Soviet Russian example of it.
This should be particularly true if the Soviets volunteer the
information that they managed a given operation right and indeed
had matured into expertise in the art.
The Soviets volunteer the information that they had
elaborated naval operational art in "the prewar years" in
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Naval Forces Field Manual (BUMS-
37) into a unified set of tactical and operational views that had
a positive effect on the correct employment of naval forces at
the opening of the Great Patriotic War. 4 As an interesting
insight into their current mentality, they claim that they had a
system of operational readiness worked out that resulted in the
timely transition of fleet forces to full battle readiness that
resulted in no ship losses on the first day of the German
offensive. Since strategic circumstance dictated that the
Luftwaffe would be the only German service with the capability to
attack Soviet naval targets initially, and the only naval target
attacked by it was the port facilities area of Sevastopol, the
operational readiness remains open to interpretation. 5 On the
other hand, we see the Soviets claiming that as early as 1941
they had effected a "system of operational readiness conditions"
4Ammon, "Naval Operational Art," Morskoy Sbornik, 2, 1982,
p. 22
5See the authoritative German target list in, Russel H.S.
Stolfi, Lonnie 0. Ratley, III, and John F. O'Neil, Jr., German
Disruption of Soviet Command, Control, and Communications
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1983), pp. 190, 193,
201-205.
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that "was a new and characteristic feature of the naval art of
the Soviet Navy." 6 We see the Soviets claiming effectively
theorized and practiced operational art according to a principle
that remains close to the top of any Soviet list of principles of
military or operational art today. The Soviets also give a
concrete illustration of the success of one principle of the art
from the first day of the War.
We can probably relax, therefore, and search for a war
fighting example of a naval operation from the Great Patriotic
War that can seriously further knowledge of Soviet naval
operational art. We can also assign the most important test as
one that the Soviets themselves say they conducted the operation
right. For reasons of strategic geography, the path to the
grandfather of modern Soviet naval operations leads to the Black
Sea and immediately into challenges in understanding Soviet naval
operational art today. By the standards of the Mediterranean Sea
and Atlantic Ocean, the Black Sea is a body of water of modest
dimensions almost entirely enclosed by land. If the Atlantic can
be described as a "blue water" area, the Black Sea would best be
described as "gray water" on which any navy would find it
difficult to escape the tutelage of a great continental army
operating along the adjacent coast. Two questions arise: can we
understand naval operational art under so constrained circum-
stances? and, can we understand Soviet naval operational art as
6Ammon, "Naval Operational Art," Morskov Sbornik, 2, 1983,
p. 23.
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it has expanded its horizons to the present day? The answer to
both questions is, probably yes. Particularly as concerns the
Soviets, they probably continue to be overwhelmed by the
immediacy of the great land fronts in Central Europe and along
parts of the Chinese border. With so different a defense
mentality, the Soviets could well be imagined to envision Western
Europe as a Ukraine and the area centered in the waters between
Norway and Greenland as a Black Sea.
The Soviets recount that the fleets and flotillas in the
Black Sea employed methods of accomplishing their missions that
enriched the theory and practice of naval operational art. The
Soviets make it clear that the war fighting situation was
dominated by "conditions where the enemy had the strategic
initiative and his troops were advancing into the depths of [the]
country." Under these conditions, the Soviet navy concentrated
all efforts on assisting the ground troops in maritime sectors
and more specifically supporting them in the defense of naval
bases and coastal territories against ground attack. The fleets
and flotillas were operationally subordinated to the ground
commanders of maritime fronts and independent armies. The
Soviets did this to ensure the more effective employment of the
navy in the interests of the ground troops and to assure more
flexible control over them. 7 They established "Defense Areas"
around Odessa and Sevastopol in 1941 in which they subordinated
7Ammon, "Naval Operational Art," Morskov Sbornik . 2, 1983,
p. 24
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defending ground troops, naval forces, aviation, and means of
support to a single centralized command authority. The Soviets
claim that these Defense Areas fully justified themselves and
became a new characteristic feature of naval operational art.
As the Germans missed their immediate opportunity to seize
Moscow in August 1941, the Soviets began the recovery that would
place them on the winning side in the Second World War, albeit
almost four years later. With Moscow still in its hands, the
Headguarters , Supreme High Command (Stavka, VGK) , in October
1941, established a Unified Command of Crimean Forces with the
51st Separate Army, Maritime Army, and all units on the Crimean
Peninsula subordinate to it, and with the Black Sea Fleet
operationally under its control. Surprisingly, the Soviets
(Stavka itself) placed Vice Admiral G. Levchenko in command of
the force. They guickly assumed their Soviet identity by
establishing Levchenko' s staff on the basis of personnel of the
51st Separate Army without a navy department on the staff. The
Soviets were on the verge of getting the command relationship
right as early as October 1941, but with confusion still
apparent
.
In accordance with their thinking on fighting in maritime
areas, they worked out "the best form of organizing strategic
command of naval forces in joint actions with the troops" in
April 1942. 8 Stavka, VGK, in that month established High
8Rear Admiral V. Yasenovenko and Captain 1st Rank V.
Koryavkov, "Some Questions of Command and Control of Army and
Navy Forces in Joint Actions," Morskov Sbornik . No. 5, 1986, p.
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Command, North Caucasus Sector, and specified a strategic
grouping including the Crimean Front, Sevastopol Defense Area,
North Caucasus Military District, Black Sea Fleet, and Azov
Flotilla. The Soviets placed a naval element of over 25
personnel on the staff of the North Caucasus strategic grouping.
The naval element successfully coordinated the actions of the
naval forces within the great maritime front with the powerful
Soviet ground forces in the Crimea and North Caucasus in 1942.
Renamed North Caucasus Front in May 1942, the forces noted above
continued to be organized under the successful formula of army
front headquarters with a strong naval staff element.
During the period June 1941 — November 1942, the Soviets
remained largely on the strategic defensive. As a result, the
navy conducted the most important naval operations "on the
seaward flanks of Soviet ground forces in the course of defensive
operations under very difficult conditions." 9 The Soviets note
that the largest landing action on an operational scale in the
first phase of the war was the Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation
(26 December 1941 — 2 January 1942) in the Crimean area. 10 With
typical frenetic Soviet energy, the Unified Command of the Crimea
28.
9Captain 1st Rank Ye. Dvoryanov, "Some Tendencies in the
Development of Control of Naval Troops and Forces in Amphibious
Landings," Morskov Sbornik, No. 1, 1981, p. 15.
10According to, Captain 1st Rank (Reserve) V. Vorob'yev,
"Landing Operations of the Black Sea Fleet in the Great Patriotic
War (Questions of Planning and Preparation)," Morskov Sbornik .
No. 3, 1985, pp. 29, 30.
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massed troops of the 44th and 51st Armies totalling 42,000 men
and elements of the Soviet navy including 77 warships including
two cruisers, six destroyers, six gunboats and over 180 auxiliary
vessels, transports, and other floating equipment. Army
Lieutenant General D. Kozlov, commander of the Caucasus Front,
provided general direction while navy Vice Admiral F.
Oktyabr 'skiy, commander of the Black Sea Fleet directed the naval
forces. For the operation, the Soviets subordinated the entire
Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla to the army front commander
who threw virtually all of the naval forces of the Black Sea into
the amphibious landing.
The Soviets landed an impressively large number of troops in
the operation and showed extraordinary strategic aggressiveness
in holding out this potential defensive reserve and using it to
launch a major counteroffensive from the sea. The Soviets timed
the operation well because the Germans had begun a major
offensive on 17 December 1941 against Sevastopol with the
strategic goal of seizing the great Soviet naval base there and
securing the southern flank of their forces in the Ukraine. The
commander of the attacking German 11th Army had determined to
take great risks in concentrating his forces against Sevastopol
and had left only a single German infantry division and weak
Rumanian forces to defend the eastern part of the peninsula where
the Soviets planned to execute their landing. 11 Thanks to their
i:LSee the German version in U.S. Army War College, Art of
War Colloquium, Large Unit Operations Service, Selected German
Army Operations on the Eastern Front . Vol. VIIA, Field Army
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own strategic aggressiveness and the favorable chance that the
Germans had stripped their eastern defense to a minimum, the
Soviets faced prospects of carrying out a naval amphibious
landing operation that would achieve major strategic goals — at
the least the seizure of the Kerch peninsula and the halting of
the German attack on Sevastopol, and at the most, the collapse of
the German position in the Crimea.
In their postwar analyses of their most important naval
operation of the first phase of the Great Patriotic War, the
Soviets emphasize that they successfully combined the three most
important principles of operational art, namely: deception,
surprise, and massing of forces along the main axis. The latter
principle is tricky in its application to the naval operations
conducted in the open sea or ocean but easy to discern in an
amphibious operation. The Soviets massed the bulk of the
otherwise widely distributed forces at Feodosiya in position to
cut off the German forces on the Kerch Peninsula and to drive
toward Sevastopol. In a real lesson of Soviet operational
mentality, the Soviets made 12 separate sea and airborne landings
far to the east around Kerch on 2 6 December 1941. The Soviets
intended to deceive the Germans as concerns the main axis of the
attack scheduled to unfold at Feodosiya three davs later and
approximately 65 road miles to the east . The Soviets also landed
strong enough forces to pin down and attempt to destroy the
Operations (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1983), pp.
161-175, and also Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost
Victories (Chicago: Regnery, 1958), pp. 222-227.
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German infantry division deployed north and south of the city of
Kerch. If operational art can be defined as stringing together
tactical actions into a greater simple operation as defined by
its mission to achieve a clear strategic goal, the Soviets
orchestrated a unigue deceptive feint around Kerch with strong
forces of the 51st Army (13,000 men). The feint was unigue
because the Soviets made it strong enough to become a secondary
axis of the operation after the landing along the main axis at
Fevdosiya by stronger forces of the 44th Army (23,000 men) on 29
December 1941.
The Soviet landing at Feodosiya precipitated an immediate
German withdrawal from Kerch and the entire peninsula to the west
of it. The local German commander, already engaged with strong
Soviet forces from 26-28 December 1941 around Kerch, and faced
with a Soviet landing 65 miles to his rear, simply disengaged the
German infantry divisions under his command and immediately moved
out of the Kerch Peninsula. To retrieve the situation around
Feodosiya, with or without the precipitous although decisive
withdrawal from Kerch, the overall German commander was forced to
halt the attack against Sevastopol. The Soviets are guire
accurate in their claim that "the Kerch-Feodosiya operation, the
first large joint offensive operation of land forces and the
fleet, resulted in the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula [and]
11-10




We can learn a lot about Soviet naval operational art by
using the Kerch-Feodosiya operation as an historical model of a
successful Soviet naval operation. First of all, the Soviets
were engaged in a real war on the strategic defensive in a
different situation against first class western opposition.
Several useful points can be made here for purposes of
reinforcing the value of this case. The Soviets were not
fighting against technically backward, demoralized, strategically
surprised Japanese forces (1945) , or tough, tactically superior,
but strategically finished and outnumbered German forces (1944-
45) . In a word, the Soviets could not lose against the Germans
in 1944-45 or the Japanese in 1945 with the lesser stress and
different mentality suggested by such a situation. The Soviets
faced a real possibility of bloody tactical defeat and
operational disaster resulting in failure to achieve the
strategic goal of holding on to Sevastopol and opening another
front in the Crimea. They faced the possibility of grand,
possibly campaign-turning defeat in the south. Interestingly,
the Soviets today in the hypothesized case of a strategic
offensive in Central Europe, face a similar degree of challenge
and parallel quality of stress. Notwithstanding the Soviet
penchant for working out adequate correlations of force, the
12See, for example, Vorob'yev, "Landing Operations, Great
Patriotic War," Morskov Sbornik, 3, 1985, p. 31.
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Soviets would be faced with the real possibility of setbacks in
any conventional offensive against intact western forces in
Europe and resultant failure to achieve the strategic goals
inspiring the war. This fundamental similarity in the two
situations — the real possibility of losing — suggests that the
Soviets would emphasize the style and principles of operational
art dictated by the Kerch-Feodosiya situation.
Uncertain of victory and therefore doubly afraid of defeat,
the Soviets nevertheless showed decisiveness in the choice of
strategic goals. They matched forces and means with the
strategic missions assigned to elements of the 44th and 51st
Armies to achieve the strategic goals. In their own words, the
Soviets applied the following principles effectively in the
practice of operational art in the Kerch-Fevdosiya landing:
1. Principle of surprise achieved in landings both on 6 and
29 December 1941. Of the six methods delineated by Soviet
authorities to achieve surprise, the Soviets exerted:
a
.
Deception through a unique combined feint and
secondary axis.
b. Concealment of preparations.
c. Secrecy of intentions.
d. Choice of time and axis of secondary and main
attacks.
2. Principle of massing (S. Gorshov) or concentration (V.Ye.
Savkin) exerted in the concentration of force at Feodosiya.
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3. Principle of maneuver exerted in time and location of the
main and secondary axes of landing.
The Soviets give the landings highest marks for a naval
operation in support of the Army. The Great Patriotic War would
be won or lost by the Soviet Army and the best the navy could do
would be to support it on its maritime, enclosed sea flanks. The
Stavka, VGK, enforced a unified military strategy on the armed
forces that focused the navy operation on support of the army
during the entire war. While on the strategic defensive, the
navy practiced the operational art of stringing together tactical
combat actions in discrete time and place to achieve strategic
goals. Later in the war, the army went over largely to the
strategic offense in the year 1943 and completely during 1944-45.
During the latter time, the army operated in grand offensives
similar to those postulated by NATO authorities in the event of a
Soviet strategic offensive in Europe today. During the same
time, under the very different circumstances of offensive
operations, the Soviet navy continued to enrich Soviet naval
operational art with examples of circumscribed operations
demanded by the exigencies of a great continental land war. We
could make a good case today for Soviet naval landing operations
against Northern and Central Norway that would be similar in
spirit and style to those at Kerch and Feodosiya.
Perhaps we could even generalize that the Soviet naval
operation today would be that of Kerch and Fevdosiya, not so much
because it would be an amphibious operation conducted at a minute
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distance from Soviet naval bases, but because it would be an
operation linked to a central unified strategy that would demand
naval operations in support of the advance of ground armies, the
defense of areas in which the army would remain on the defensive,
and the air defense of the strategic rear. Based on the example
of Kerch and Feodosiya and without the additives of precision
guided missiles technically and reconnaissance-strike imperatives
tactically, we see Soviet naval operational art dominated by the
principles of surprise and concentration and the supporting
method of deception.
In summary of examining a dominating Soviet naval operation
of World War II the following equations suggest themselves:
Time: 1942-1943 Time: Today
The Black Sea The Norwegian Sea
is to is to
The Crimea as Scandinavia
(Kerch-Feodosiya) (N. Norwegian coast)
is to is to
The Ukraine Central Europe
Putting together Kerch-Feodosiya as distilled essence of
Soviet naval operational art in World War II and adding to it the
ongoing conventional revolution in precision guided munitions and
automated reconnaissance-strike tactics, we get a surprisingly
coherent picture. The Soviets consistently return to the
"principle-themes" in naval and military operational art of
surprise, concentrating (or, massing of forces and fires)
associated principle of correlation of force, and the method of
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deception in their analyses of military operations in World War
II. In considering the revolution in accuracy and range of
weapons today, the Soviets hammer on the themes of surprise,
massing of fires, and the method of deception in startlingly
similar degree, claiming that the opening of mass, surprise fires




SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART:
WHAT THE SOVIETS SAY ABOUT IT
No less an authority than Admiral of the Soviet Fleet, S.G.
Gorshkov, recent commander in chief of the Soviet navy, presents
the view that at the turn of the century by approximately 1910,
naval art produced a new form of fleet combat activity — the
naval operation — which created the need for appropriate
measures for its support: operational reconnaissance, cover and
deception, the defense of major surface naval vessels during
transit and in combat against submarines, etc. 1 With the
appearance of the modern naval operation, Gorshkov and other
Soviet naval authorities note a logical progression where their
country generally had developed the naval art theoretically
before the Great Fatherland War. The general art also included
naval operational art which is succinctly described as,
...the theory and practice of preparing and conducting all-
fleet, landing, and antilanding operations; employment of
naval forces in combined-arms operations together with other
branches of the Armed Forces, and in independent operations. 2
The Soviets claim that they had developed the content of the
naval operation as the aggregate of battles, actions, strikes,
and maneuvers of mixed forces coordinated and interrelated by
^•ONI, SME, Naval . I, January 83, entry: Naval Art [signed,
S.G. Gorshkov].
2See in, Ammon, "Naval Operational ARt," Morskoy Sbornik .
2, 1985, p. 22.
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objectives, missions, place, and time and conducted under a
single concept and plan. They indicate that they had developed
naval operational art by 1941 with sufficient completeness to
survive the great German surprise attack of the summer of that
year.
In discussing modern war, the naval operation, and naval
operational art, the Soviets often present their ideas obliquely
in terms such as the principles of operational art, historical
cases of naval combat particularly from the Second World War to
include both Soviet and western examples, and commentary on
current trends in both technology and tactical thought. The
Soviet Union is controlled by a single political party that
claims to be operating under a scientific world historical
outlook superior to any other. The centralized and intensively
organized Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has unified
political and military thinking at the highest level and
demanded conformance with the alleged scientific approach.
Theorizing about military and naval art, as a result, is
encouraged as a means for maintaining political control and as a
way to keep the scientific rigor in military art, doctrine, and
science. The Soviets emphasize theory and associated principle
in their military writings about military and naval operational
art. We can learn a lot about Soviet naval operational art by
studying the unified principles associated with it and discussed
so prolifically by Soviet writers.
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The Soviets think in terms of scientifically deduced general
regulating principles of military operational art that apply
fundamentally also to naval operational art. The principles
that the Soviets subscribe to are similar to the principles of
war taught, for example, to officers in the armed forces of the
United States, United Kingdom, and France. The long Soviet list
of principles of military art — (1) readiness, (2) surprise,
(3) assets (use all) , (4) coordination, (5) concentration (on
main axis)
, (6) full depth (defeat of enemy to) , (7) political-
military factors (calculation of)
, (8) control (continuous
troop)
, (9) energy (resolving of ongoing problems) , (1) rear
organization (for continuous support) , and (11) reserves (timely
restoration of) 3 — include most of the principles of war
considered as valid in the west. The Soviet principles of
military operational art are described in terms similar to those
above but generally listed as fewer in number, for example, (1)
mobility (tempo of combat)
, (2) concentration (on main axis)
,
(3) surprise, (4) energy (combat activeness) , (5) reserves (or
preservation of combat effectiveness)
, (6) conformity of goals
with means, and (7) coordination. 4 The Soviet principles of
naval operational art, given the centralized unification of
Soviet military thought, include the same principles noted
above. The naval principles will be accentuated or attenuated
3Colonel V.Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Soviet
Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View ) (Moscow, 1972)
(Translated by U.S. Air Force), p.
4 Ibid., p. 115.
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in importance compared with the more general military principles
because of the unique sea and oceanic operating conditions or
"terrain" of the naval operation.
Surprise is in many ways the supreme principle of Soviet
naval operational art. The Soviets labor today under the
adverse psychological impact of the surprise attack of the
Germans in 1941. The Soviets failed to exert the principle of
readiness, allowed the Germans to surprise them, and fell into
chaos through associated failure in coordination, control, and
concentration of effort. Within the almost incredibly short
period of two weeks, the Germans could claim with ample
supporting evidence that they had defeated the Soviet Union.
Only the highest level redirection of the German main axis away
from Moscow and into the Ukraine — i.e., an error of Adolf
Hitler personally at the highest level of German military
strategy — saved the Soviets in the summer of 1941. To this
formidable historical baggage the Soviets have been forced to
add the special importance of surprise in any exchange of
nuclear weapons because of their long ranges, accuracy, massive
destructive effects, and short times of flight. And, finally,
the Soviets face today a revolutionary increase in the
importance of surprise in conventional warfare with the advent
of long range precision guided munitions and automated launching
of massed strikes upon initial reconnaissance contact.
In recent studies on surprise and the success of combat
actions at sea, the Soviets have made revealing comments about
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surprise in naval warfare by describing historical lessons for
present day application from a Russian Soviet mentality. After
analyzing surprise attacks by "capitalist" naval forces in
recent history as a foil to theorize about the Soviet naval
operation and naval operational art, one authority notes that
"methods by which an aggressor achieved surprise were quite
varied [but] produced the greatest effect when they were
employed all together under a unified plan." 5 Although the
historical cases are somewhat strained, the Soviet authority is
warning a Soviet audience about the western propensity toward
surprise attack and the manifest dangers from it. The Soviets
evidently believe that surprise is best, most scientifically,
and systematically achieved by being an integral part of a
highly centralized, "unified plan." History is exploited to
support this thesis and warn the reader of the necessity for
effective naval warfare to be conducted under a unified plan
which must provide for and attempt to achieve surprise.
Given the special importance of surprise to the Soviets,
they have developed a systematic list of "methods" for achieving
it. The Soviets define surprise as "actions unexpected by the
enemy which enhance the achievement of success in combat, in an
operation, and in war." 6 They continue on to elaborate that,
5Captain 1st Rank A. Aristov, "Surprise Factor Effect on
the Success of Combat Actions at Sea," Morskov Sbornik . No. 1,
1985, pp. 22, 23.
6See in, ONI, SME, Naval . I, January 83, entry: Surprise
[ signed Yu . V . Chuyev ]
.
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...surprise is one of the major principles of military art and
consists of choosing the time, procedure, and modes of combat
operations which make it possible to strike when the enemy is
least prepared to ward off a strike and thereby paralyze his
will to organize resistance. 7
To accomplish this paralysis that the Soviets feel is so
important, they have developed a unique operational subculture
of methods that include the peculiarly Russian factor of
maskirovka — masking or obscuring of their intentions.
Maskirovka and the other methods are not ends in themselves but
allow the Soviets to mass fires unexpectedly against the
strongest enemy naval targets along the most weakly defended
axis of attack.
In one authoritative Soviet encyclopedic description of
maskirovka that has been translated into English, the U.S.
linguist suggests the words camouflage, deception, and masking
as meanings for the Russian term. In the translated document,
the Soviets describe maskirovka (i.e., roughly deception) as the
"aggregate of measures to deceive the adversary regarding the
presence and disposition of ... forces. . .targets, their status and
condition, combat readiness and actions, and their command
authority plan." 8 Maskirovka is also designated a category of
operational and tactical support. The Soviets additionally
distinguish operational camouflage, concealment, and deception
(operativnava maskirovka ) as being
7Ibid.
8Soviet Union, MED, V, 1986, p. 1774
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...accomplished by means of carrying out feints and decoy
(diversionary) actions, simulating concentrations and
deployment of [forces and resources], deception, and
dissemination of false information on the state of one's own
troops and the character of forthcoming actions during
preparations for and conduct of operations. 9
Maskirovka is planned and organized by front, military district,
and fleet headquarters on the basis of an operation plan.
The Soviet naval writer, Captain A. Aristov, lists the
methods of achieving surprise as the following. The list
illustrates the Soviet penchant for system, pedantry, and
formalism in being scientific about war.
Methods of Achieving Surprise




2. Simulation of Force Actions and Various Friendly Targets
3. Concealment of Preparations for Combat
4. Employment of New Weapons and Methods of Conducting
Combat Unknown to the Enemy
5. Choice of Time and Axis for Main Attack
6. Speed of Maneuver and Decisiveness of Force Actions
The list is well considered and systematically derived and
shows the Soviets as being in deadly earnest about naval
operational art. The Soviets consider deception as an
"integral" part of any naval operation and one of the most
9Ibid.
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important methods for the attainment of surprise. They consider
surprise in turn as the most important principle for application
in the Soviet naval operation along with concentration of forces
(army) or massing of fires (navy) along the main axis of an
attack.
As evidenced by the special methods used by the Soviets to
effect surprise, western naval forces can safely expect to be
deceived and should be prepared to react to surprise achieved in
some degree by Soviet naval forces conducting a naval operation
against them. The English word, deception, noted above to
describe an important, integral part of any Soviet naval
operation, is close but not completely adequate for conveying
the meaning of the words used in Russian. The English word,
deception, is used to give the meaning of the Russian,
maskirovka . and more loosely, hedrost . The Russian meaning for
maskirovka . however, is concealment, cover, camouflage, or
hiding, meanings that gravitate mostly toward hiding or masking.
The Russian meaning for hedrost is cunning or trickery and as
applied as a method for achieving surprise, gravitates towards
confusing an opponent — the enemy sees what is going on but he
does not understand it. 10 Under the English heading, deception,
the Soviets will be doing a variety of Russian things including
practicing cunning and effecting naval camouflage. The Soviets
10This brief "analysis" based on discussion with Assistant
Professor, Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin, Naval Postgraduate School.
Professor Tsypkin is a native Russian speaker from the Moscow
area who served on active duty for approximately one year as a
reserve officer in the Soviet army.
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probably conceptualize that military cunning makes the commander
of military forces successful in deception while deception in
turn makes it most possible for him to achieve surprise.
In the area of joint operations with the army and especially
in amphibious landing operations, the Soviets dwell on the
importance of surprise equally as much as in independent
operations in oceanic TVDs (TSMAs) . The Soviets invariably link
surprise with concentration of effort along the main axis of
attack (army, army-navy landing) or the naval version of massing
strikes against the strongest enemy target. The Soviets
maintain that since the factor of surprise exists over a
comparatively short period of time, careful application of
operational art is required to convert potential opportunities
into real success. They note the time-honored factor in the
west that "during the disembarkation of the first wave, the main
body of troops is almost incapacitated, and the landing force
lacks maneuverability in the early stages [ashore]." 11 They
maintain that analysis of past wars shows the advantages of
surprise with its effect of stunning an enemy and establishing
an overwhelming concentration of force and winning correlation
of force. To achieve surprise in an amphibious operation, the
Soviets say means primarily to conceal from the enemy the
purpose and concept of planned military [tactical] actions, the
11Captain 1st Rank (Retired) K. Penzin, Doctor of Naval
Sciences, Professor, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, "Surprise
in Amphibious Landing Operations and Measures to Achieve It
(from the combat experience of foreign fleets)," Morskov
Sbornik . No. 4, 1980, p. 12.
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scope, means, and methods by which they will be conducted and
supported, and the place and time of the troop landing. Whether
it be the controlling or supporting service in an amphibious
landing, the Soviet navy will practice operational art by
exerting the principles of concentration (massing) and surprise
and the method of deception.
Probably the most important principle of Soviet military
operational art and one somewhat more important even than
surprise to the Soviets is, in English parlance, concentration
of effort. In describing the principle that we refer to as
concentration, the Soviets use the words,
massing of forces and resources, the concentration in main and
decisive sectors (action areas) of forces and resources or
their fire (strikes) for ensuring the rout of the enemy and
the achievement of the goal of the operation (engagement). 12
In land warfare, it must be evident that military operational
art consists of ensuring the concentration of forces and
resources along the ground of the main axis of advance. In
warfare at sea in independent or newly emerging Soviet combined
fleet operations in oceanic TVDs (TSMAs) , the Soviets must exert
this principle through the massing of fires and strikes from
naval forces that may be either concentrated or dispersed. This
interpretation of Soviet naval concentration of effort is
demanded by the unique geographical terrain in which the naval
operation takes place. In an oceanic TVD (TSMA) , Soviet naval
forces are not constrained to seize and hold ocean space or




forced to advance according to the dictates of mountain, swamp,
urban area, etc. The Soviet naval operation will be strike
oriented and Soviet naval operational art will systematically
and predictably execute the operation with stiff emphasis on a
winning correlation of strike weapons.
In joint operations with the army, for example, amphibious
landings in a maritime-style TVD (TSMA) , the navy would exert
operational art more conventionally. Whether or not the navy
were the controlling service in the operation, it would be
forced to concentrate forces, means, and fires on the land area
of the bridgehead and the sea approaches to it. The Soviets
note, for example, that during the Second World War, navies
massed forces and resources — the naval force, the landing
troops, and aircraft — on the main landing sectors. With
inimitable consistency, the Soviets continue on to say that "in
doing so, a decisive superiority of forces and resources was
often created." 13 Obliquely, the Soviets tell us here that
Soviet naval operational art concentrates forces, resources, and
fires in amphibious landing operations and does so within a set
of rules that demands the establishment of winning correlations
of force.
The Soviets succinctly comment on this business of massing
in the open sea by arguing that in operations aimed at
annihilating naval forces and disrupting sea lanes, the massing
of forces is achieved by concentrating the efforts of both
13 Ibid.
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homogeneous and heterogeneous naval forces against the more
important enemy ship groupings and convoys. Operating out of
various sectors, they deliver simultaneous and successive
strikes at the enemy until he is completely routed. The Soviets
reveal a peculiarity in their way of thinking with the words
homogeneous and heterogeneous naval forces. Soviet naval
operational art dictates the massing of strikes against the
strongest enemy targets but so do naval tactics in the west.
The Soviets send a signal on their mentality both in terms of
the emphasis on system and a lingering lack of confidence in
handling naval forces. The signal is that to be systematic in
naval operational art, you must differentiate between
homogeneous (e.g., all-submarine, all-naval long range aviation,
etc.) forces and heterogeneous forces able to engage in combat.
Recently in 1986, a Soviet naval authority brought together
in a brief article the regularities of modern naval operations.
Written against the background of increased emphasis on
conventional warfare and the "new stage of the scientific-
technical revolution," the article summarizes the regularities,
content, and characteristic features of the modern naval
operation. In it, the Soviets emphasize that the regularities
of conducting combat actions at sea are dictated by general laws
of warfare and by the unique features of the conduct of combat
at sea. Regularities are described as similar to laws but with
multiple meanings and more flexible application, for example,
they can reflect necessary relationships among phenomena without
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indicating a particular law. 14 The Soviets elaborate that
regularities of the modern naval operation are based on a group
of laws of war that start to act at the beginning of a war and
which dictate the course and outcome of combat actions. In a
weighty commentary on the Soviet style in war, the Soviet
authority, who can be taken as speaking for the navy, i.e., "the
Soviets," states that the laws of war and associated regulari-
ties or principles of naval operational art "essentially are
aspects (components) of a more general law — the determining
role of the correlation of the belligerents' material and
spiritual forces." 15 This statement by the first deputy chief
of the Main Navy Staff supports the important interpretation
that the Soviets believe the most important regularity (or
principle) of naval operational art is the massing of strikes
against the main strength of the naval opponent along a main
axis of attack.
14See in, Admiral P. Navoytsev, First Deputy Chief of Main
Navy Staff, "Regularities, Content, and Characteristic Features






SOVIET MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART
The Soviets have written a great deal about ground forces
operational art both in extolling and explaining their success in
the Great Fatherland War and in claiming the superiority of the
Marxist-Leninist scientific dialectic of world historical
development. The Germans conducted effective military operations
at the grand tactical, i.e., operational, level in the First and
Second World Wars that influenced both the Soviets and the west.
Over the past 20 years, the U.S. Army has begun to emphasize
conducting warfare systematically at the operational level based
on the special success of the Germans at the tactical and
operational levels in recent war and the formidable attributes of
the Soviet ground forces which have espoused operational art and
trumpeted its virtues. Soviet military and army operational art
have become well known particularly with the U.S. Army emphasis
on a more systematic approach to war at the operational level.
In sharp contrast to this situation of . familiarity, military
officers and civilian analysts in the west are less conversant
with Soviet naval operational art — the U.S. Navy does not
espouse or practice it and the U.S. Army must tread on uncertain
ground in examining naval operational art because of the grand
question of the "uniqueness" of naval warfare.
IV-
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Several extremely important questions are susceptible to
analysis in this situation. The U.S. Army is comfortably
familiar with Soviet military operational art but also needs
every bit of knowledge and every possible technique to deepen its
understanding. Because of the centralization and unification of
Soviet military thought, the Soviets have synchronized naval
operational art under the general principles of military art and
military operational art. Soviet naval operational art,
therefore, will be governed by general principles identical with
those of army operational art allowing western analysts to apply
understanding of one to the other. Relatively well but still
incompletely understood Soviet ground operational art can be
applied with due respect to unique features of naval warfare to
an understanding of what Soviet naval operational art must be.
Largely unexplored by U.S. naval analysts, Soviet naval
operational art presently cannot be used to: (1) further an
understanding of Soviet ground forces operational art, and (2)
add to our understanding of the Soviet mentality in preparing and
fighting war. To apply naval operational art to the better
understanding of ground forces operational art, we must ask the
questions: what are the content and characteristic features of
the Soviet naval operation? What are the unique characteristics
of the naval war fighting environment? Among identically defined
principles of military and naval operational art, what is the





In discussing the content of the naval operation, the first
deputy chief of the Main Navy Staff claims that the following
definition provides the fullest definition of a naval operation
as a form of military actions: the aggregate of simultaneous and
successive engagements, actions, and strikes conducted by naval
forces, coordinated and interrelated by objective, mission, place
and time for the purpose of repelling an aggressor in ocean and
sea theaters of military actions, often to accomplish
operational-strategic or operational missions in coordination
with other branches of the armed forces. In the content of the
"operation at sea," the Soviets include Soviet objectives and
missions, enemy targets of action, composition of friendly
forces, factors of support, command and control, and the
geographic (ocean, sea, coastal) factors. Similar descriptions
of the Soviet naval operation have been equated in different
context in other parts of this study and the content of the
operation is recognizable to most army and navy officers as the
headings for the important parts of any plan for a western combat
operation.
Within the above nicely systematic framework, one Soviet
naval authority makes several points which characterize Soviet
thinking about war at sea. He notes that "in contrast to
equipment of other branches of the Armed Forces, losses in modern
submarines and surface combatants are essentially irreplaceable





. of irreplaceable loss within the time of the naval operation
results in special measures required to keep naval forces
tracking towards the strategic goals of the operation. We see
here a coherent explanation for the unique Soviet emphasis on
"survival" (i.e., operational survival) in naval warfare, the
peculiar Soviet emphasis on the obvious necessity to continue in
the fight after the main strike.
Admiral Navoytsev gives more insight into the Soviet naval
operational mentality by emphasizing "the first strike" as the
most powerful, massive, and comprehensively supported and using
the term: combat actions on the main axis. These things are
well known from other avenues of approach, but he continues on to
make an extraordinarily valuable observation that formations of
the ground forces carry out a deployment or redeployment on
friendly territory under cover of a constantly operating defense
system, but naval forces carry out deployments across zones of
possible enemy action. Here is a unique factor in naval
operations compared with ground that will be a difference in the
applicability of the principles of operational art.
In describing typical characteristics of operations at sea,
the Soviets give us a chance to gauge the unique features and
environment from their perspective. Most of the characteristics
that the Soviets describe are typical in similar degree to ground
operations, for example:
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Typical Characteristics of Operations at Sea
1. Decisiveness




4. Mixed and Combined Forces
5. Massed Employment (of Forces, Means)
6. Electronic Warfare (Wide Use)
7. Complex Coordination.
Among these characteristics, at least three stand out as
being potentially so exaggerated in naval warfare and in the
naval operation that they take on the quality of being unique.
Those characteristics are decisiveness, spatial scope, and
electronic warfare. Although army operations are "decisive,"
navy operations are exaggeratedly so. At Jutland (31 May-1 June
1916) , for example, the opposing naval forces engaged in gun
duels intermittently for a total period of approximately one hour
of actual firing in six hours of maneuvering in tactical
proximity each to the other. During that brief gun firing, the
two sides lost approximately 10,000 men killed in action. The
concentration of naval forces in a relatively small number of
relatively small but valuable and densely populated maneuver
elements commonly results in astounding combat results in brief
time periods. Precision guided munitions with long ranges and
large warheads would tend to accentuate the characteristics of
decisiveness in naval operations. Similarly, the characteristics
IV-
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, of spatial scope and electronic warfare are exaggerated to the
point of uniqueness compared with ground operations.
In vigorous discussion in the early 1980s, the Soviets
debated the special nature of naval warfare and noted eight
features inherent in naval warfare. 2 Every one of these features
can be seen to be either unique to naval operations or untowardly
important in them. The Soviets state that, (1) offensive naval
actions at sea do not attempt to seize ground except, of course,
in amphibious and other similar joint operations. It is
difficult to fault the Soviets here; they have hit upon a unique
feature of the naval operation. Their discovery is important for
us in attempting to relate ground and naval operational art and
to increase the understanding of the ground art by fitting
together missing pieces of the puzzle. The question is: how
does this unique feature of the naval operation bend naval
operational art into a different shape from that of the army? An
answer would be that Soviet naval operational art is more
decisive in the way it exerts the principle of massing forces,
means, and fires along the main axis of the attack. The Soviet
navy does not seize surface ocean water, it concentrates on
massing accurate, long range fires against the strongest enemy
naval targets. It operates independently of the concept of an
axis of advance determined in advance and bound in direction and
location by the logic of ground terrain. In addition, naval
2See, for example, Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, "Some Issues of
the Theory of the Development and Employment of the Navy,"
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 4, 1981, pp.
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operational art concentrates the massed strikes of the naval
operation against the strongest enemy weapons platforms and
appropriate supporting targets. The naval targets will be
uniquely dense, relatively small in numbers, and subject to the
unique catastrophic destruction of naval warfare — being sunk.
Closely associated with the above factor, the Soviets note
that (2) in naval warfare objectives are achieved by attack
against the strongest targets. The situation in naval warfare is
a sharply etched one in which a few powerful naval targets
capable of dangerous strikes against friendly naval and ground
targets must be destroyed immediately upon detection. To
attacking Soviet ground forces no such threat exists from the
defending enemy army group to the Soviet front or associated
hinterland. The pivotal Soviet military principle of
concentration along the main axis gets decisively changed here.
In ground warfare, over and above the establishment of an
adequate correlation of forces in the TVD (TSMA) , the Soviets
will practice concentrating their strongest forces against the
weakest possible defenders along terrain axes also selected to
lead to the envelopment and surrounding of the stronger enemy
forces. In naval warfare, the opposing forces, particularly the
stronger one, will launch massed strikes directly against the
strongest targets along the axis of strike least well defended.
These are heavy differences between the naval and ground
operation. They also show army operational art as less decisive
in its cast than naval. We might generalize that given the
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. tactically "permissive" nature of oceanic terrain over and above
the technical side effects of sinking weapons platforms, the
Soviet navy has mastered terrain and passed to a "higher level"
of warfare in which immediate direct attack against an enemy is
characteristic. Using this to forecast future Soviet ground
operational art, we could characterize it as becoming similar to
naval
.
The Soviets continue on to note that (3) defensive naval
actions often do not have the purpose to hold terrain. This
situation is in sharp contrast with ground warfare in which
defending forces concentrate exclusively on terrain factors, for
example, holding specific terrain at all cost, trading specific
terrain for time, and slowing an opponent in specific terrain
while accepting profligate, possibly fatal, casualties but
denying him vital ground. The Soviets describe a situation that
is different from any ground situation when a defending naval
force is relatively strong and has large ocean space left in
which to maneuver against a stronger attacker. An inexorable
logic develops though in which the defending naval force is
driven back to its own coastal area, associated straits,
approaches, narrows, etc., which it defends in a way similar to
ground forces. In the open ocean, however, defending naval
forces will not be tied to the defense of specific terrain, and
the Soviets are largely correct in pointing this out as a factor
of uniqueness in the defensive naval operation.
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The Soviets claim uniqueness in naval operations in stating
that, (4) in naval warfare deployment and redeployment may take
weeks and may take place over hostile terrain. They tell us
several interesting things about themselves in the claim. We
must infer that "weeks" is a long time and excessive compared
with the standard we must assume of ground war. We can also
infer that the concept of deployment is especially important to
them to be broken out separately in such an analysis and that the
factor probably represents frustration on the part of the naval
service in educating the army on the distances, exposure of
plans, and unique dangers inherent in naval deployments. Unlike
the Germans, for example, representing a great land power but who
took vast deployments in their stride, the Soviets reveal a fussy
preoccupation with deployment that becomes magnified in
importance in the practice of naval operational art.
Other factors that the Soviets suggest as being unique to
naval warfare are not so credible as those above. They list as
especially characteristic and unusual the points that (5) fleets
employ extraordinarily diverse weapons, and (6) some naval forces
are severely constrained by weather. Modern armies, however,
employe diverse weapons and are severely constrained by weather
in their cross-country mobility and by combinations of weather
and terrain almost as paralyzing as wind, wave, and surf in naval
amphibious operations.
In pointing out unusual and particularly important features
of naval warfare, the Soviets imply uniqueness in (7) the scope
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of naval operations which may easily be global. The surface of
the sea is a vast highway for Soviet navy combat and support
forces. Naval forces are uniquely flexible in their peacetime
ability to loiter and concentrate almost any place in the world
touched by salt water. The Soviet navy has developed the surface
support forces or trains to support a significant naval presence
world-wide and an impressive number of foreign bases. The Soviet
navy must still be regarded fundamentally as a sea denial force
and the fact of its capability to present itself world-wide in
peacetime does not necessarily translate into significant global
operations in wartime. The Soviets are quite correct therefore
in describing that naval operations may be global, but Soviet
naval operations will not necessarily have that feature.
A last factor described by the Soviets as a unique feature
of naval operations is (8) combat activity in four terrain media,
namely sea surface, undersea, air, and ground. Particularly when
we consider amphibious operations, the Soviet navy is uniquely
busy and varied in its physical combat environment, Soviet naval
operational art can be predicted to have special problems in
coordinating forces so varied as undersea, surface, and air over
the vast distances associated with the open ocean. Soviet naval
operational art will be challenged by the problems of command and
control under such circumstances and will show exaggerated
concern for coordination in the naval operation.
Ocean and sea dominate the physical media in which naval
i
warfare takes place today. Analysts of modern war have taken in
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at a glance the vast difference between' sea and land a
geographical terrain for combat and almost universally agree that
the naval environment is uniquely different from the land. In
sharp contrast, much ink continues to be spilled over the
perennial issue of whether or not naval warfare is unique. The
Soviets take the unequivocal stand that the general principles of
Soviet military art apply also to naval and naval operational
art. In effect, they maintain that the scientifically derived
principles of military art that have centered on the army apply
to all the services and are modified only by prudent regard for
the physical environment of the combat. In the case of naval
warfare, the Soviets have described and debated the question of
the unique features of naval warfare. They have made effective
arguments in support of several unique features of the naval
operation but have not moved toward any claim of uniqueness of
the naval operation or naval operational art.
The picture presented by the Soviets is similar in many
respects to the picture of differences between ground and naval
warfare in the west. Both pictures are classical ones of the
presentation of a case that appears to be so obvious that no
effort seems necessary to test and criticize. The sea environ-
ment is vastly different from the land. So far, so good, but how
is it different? The sea is different because it is a heavy
fluid which unless disturbed by various well-described forces is
perfectly level. Almost three-quarters of the earth's surface,
therefore, presents the spectacle of a potential battlefield
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devoid of cover, concealment, obstacle, and obstruction.
Although the fluid has no solid obstacle on its surface, it
represents in and of itself an obstacle to the movement of men on
foot or in land vehicles; all men and their land vehicles are too
heavy to move across its surface. Men in ships, in contrast, are
presented with a great highway for movement worldwide and
simultaneously a theater of naval operations larger than any
possible land theater. Catastrophe strikes when ships are
damaged in war, take in water, and sink. Alternatively, using
true submersibles, men can move through the heavy fluid
converting it into a unique three-dimensional "heavy space" for
the conduct of war from undersea against surface, air, and land
targets and opposing submarines. The formidable qualities of the
modern submarine suggest the quasi-philosophical commentary that
he who controls undersea controls the surface and in turn the
land areas of the world.
Using this approach, we see several unique features of war
at sea that can be translated into differences between Soviet
ground and naval operational art. The following list is a
reasonably full one that shows unique technical and terrain
features of naval warfare and similarly unique tactical factors
derived from them.
Naval Terrain Uniqueness
1. Featureless, fluid medium translates into unrestricted
mobility for ships operating on its surface and within it.
2. No cover, concealment for surface vessels.
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3. Unobstructed distant fields of fire for naval surface
vessels.
Naval Weapons Platforms and Weapons Uniqueness
1. Surface universe of combat dominated by relatively few
compact, high-value surface weapons platforms or targets.
2. Surface ships susceptible to immediate catastrophic kill.
3
.
Relatively invulnerable submarines hidden in opaque heavy
fluid.
Tactical Uniqueness
1. Accentuated premium in range and accuracy of naval weapons.
2. Physical camouflage (hiding) of surface ships impossible.
3. Electronic camouflage (hiding) of dense-technology surface
ships uniquely emphasized.
3. Ultra-sensitivity of surface ships to detection, targeting,
and catastrophic destruction because of range, accuracy,
and lethality of weapons that overmatch targets.
The Soviets insist that the principles of military
operational art apply to both army and navy operational art. By
extension of such thinking, we can see that they have taken the
position that common laws of war exist that govern the warfare
conducted by the five branches of the Soviet armed forces. The
Soviets must be taken to believe that naval warfare is not
unique. The Soviets make it clear, however, that the principles
of naval operational art which are identical in statement to
those of army operational art must be applied with due regard for
the real world environment and we have made the analysis that the
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naval environment is indeed uniquely different in particulars
affecting war at sea. The questions that remain to be answered
are: how does the unique environment of the sea affect the
principles of naval operational art? And, how does this effect
help us to understand the better-known although identical
principles of army operational art?
Taking probably the five most significant principles of
naval operational art — readiness, surprise, coordination,
maneuver, and massing — we can see that the unique naval factors
discussed above exaggerate in every case the impact of the
principles when they are applied to the naval operation. The
valuable equation can be suggested that naval operational art is
army operational art with every principle of application
exaggerated in importance. Why is this so? The above discussion
summarized shows that the naval environment, once mastered by the
technology of modern ship and submarine, presents fundamentally
greater latitude in the practice of war — the regulating
principles are the same but the frictions are different, less,
and war moves at a faster pace on a higher plane.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FORECASTING THE SOVIET NAVAL OPERATION:
A CONVENTIONAL WARFARE SCENARIO
A Soviet offensive in Central Europe is probably the most
popular military scenario that has been examined in the west.
Two generations of free world military officers and analysts have
looked at it from the bits and pieces or the myriad operations
that could be conducted within the scenario to the overall
picture itself. The greater picture involves sorting out the
strategic, tactical nuclear, and conventional possibilities for
action at the North Atlantic, European, and intra-European
levels. Since approximately 1980, the Soviets have increased
their emphasis on extended conventional war and the west in
parallel has decried the improvement growth in numbers of
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet emphasis on
conventional war and western concern over the counter-productive
aspects of tactical nuclear weapons, makes an extended
conventional war fashionable today (1988) . In such a scenario,
the Soviets would launch a great, conventional ground and air
attack out of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. It would have the
strategic goals to defeat the NATO armed forces on the continent
of Europe so decisively that the U.S. government would lose the
will to continue the fight and withdraw, isolated and weakened,
to the North American continent.
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Scenarios such as the one suggested here have been used by
western analysts for years. Planners have used them to forecast
the outcome of entire wars, to gauge the impact of new
technology, and to validate the effectiveness of newly considered
small unit tactics. The purpose of the scenario presented here
is to sort out the strategic missions assigned to the Soviet navy
and show how the Soviets would apply operational art to the naval
operations necessary to carry out those missions. The scenario
is one of a vast, extended conventional war. In it the Soviets
seek to occupy Western Europe from North Cape to the Straits of
Gibraltar and exclude the United States from the affairs of
Europe. These are heady Soviet strategic goals, indeed, almost
outlandish. They are within the realm of possibility, however,
and also represent the worst case possible for consideration of
conventional war.
In such a scenario with goals so decisive, the Soviet army
would take center stage in the existing key TVD (TSMA) for the
Soviet Union — the Western. Within the Western TVD (TSMA),
above all other considerations, the High Command of Forces (HCOF)
would make the ultimate calculations for the Soviets in beginning
to plan for the offensive — the correlation of forces between
NATO and Warsaw Pact in the TVD (TSMA) . The Soviets would be
faced with a situation of almost overwhelming possibilities for
action in terms of technical and tactical balances and time.
They would be forced to consider ground numerical balances,
qualitative technical balances based on weapons performance
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characteristics, questions of the tactical qualities of forces in
terms of command and combat soldier style, and the grand timing
of the operation. With so much at stake, the Soviets would have
to calculate the effects of operations conducted on the northern
and southern flanks of the great advance westward — the
Northwestern and Southwestern TVDs (TSMAs) , and, the plot
thickens for the pursuit of the elusive Soviet naval operation
and Soviet naval operational art, the Atlantic and Arctic oceanic
TVD (TSMA)
.
One of the Soviet principles of war, the use of all assets,
would come into play in Soviet calculations and force them both
through Soviet science and Russian predilection to deploy the
navy and assign it missions in support of a continentally
oriented war for them. In the style of the Soviets, the General
Staff would be faced with important questions of missions to be
assigned to the navy and questions of higher level command and
control. Questions in the following pattern would undoubtedly
arise and probably be resolved as noted. What is the fundamental
relationship between the Soviet army and navy in conventional war
for the control of the continent of Europe? The answer would
have to be that the Soviet General Staff would assign naval
missions in the Arctic, Atlantic, Northwestern, and the Western
(specifically Baltic Flank) TVDs (TSMAs) that would reflect the
most direct support possible for the army in terms of a quick
ground advance westward. This answer is supported by the Soviet
style in which army predominates over navy, and the Western TVD
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(TSMA) predominates over all others. The answer may not be the
"right" one, however, because the Strategic Rear of the Soviet
Union would be imperiled in the conventional scenario by U.S.
bombers and missiles flown directly over the Soviet Arctic Ocean
TVD (TSMA) . It is difficult to grant even the Soviet army much
control over the Arctic Oceanic TVD (TSMA) . Either the navy or
the air defense branch (PVO) of the Soviet armed forces would
probably control the HCOF in the Arctic TVD (TSMA) in an extended
conventional war. The scene is complicated additionally by
Soviet concern over a conventional war escalating to the use of
nuclear weapons. We must suspect that the strategic rocket force
and the General Staff are poised to intervene in the Arctic
giving an unusual cast to operations there even in an extended
conventional war.
If the Soviets decided to launch a conventional attack in
the west and took the initiative to plan and execute it, they
would have to be considered to have seen significant chances of
successes in the extended conventional war that they had begun.
Let us relax, therefore, on the issue of nuclear escalation, and,
except where necessary to understand certain correlated
deployments of conventional forces and weapons, assume that the
Soviets would move according to the conventional logic under
which the attack had begun. The assumption is reasonable enough.
We have only to consider that the Soviets had decided that if
their conventional offensive moved fast enough that the west
would be presented with the cruel choice between the certain
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tactical nuclear destruction of Western Europe or the uncertain
continuation of a conventional war under extremely adverse
conditions and chose the latter situation.
Within an extended conventional war in Europe centered on
the Western TVD (TSMA) , what would be the role of the Soviet
navy? Strong argument exists to support a view that the Soviets
would use it as a seaward extension of the army and a combat
support mechanism for it. The arguments in support of so
conservative a role and associated conservative Soviet naval
strategic missions, are the Soviet style and experience of the
Great Patriotic War, the centralized and unified make up of the
Soviet navy today which is not a mirror image of the sea control
forces of the west but a powerful, uniquely Soviet sea denial
instrument. Reasoning at this high level of consideration, we
can hazard the picture that the Soviets would vigorously employ
naval forces on the Baltic as a maritime extension of the Western
TVD (TSMA) . We can construct a Soviet naval operation there with
considerable confidence and understand the style and spirit of
Soviet naval operational art applied to it. Such a naval
operation would be an amphibious one directly probably against
the Danish islands between the Jutland Peninsula and Sweden,
controlled by the army, and less instructive than the
possibilities for naval operations farther north.
Moving into the Northwestern TVD (TSMA) , we see numerous
possibilities for the Soviets executing the naval operation. The
awkward choice of words here — the naval operation — is
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important to transfer the idea that the Soviets will not conduct
a lot of battles which we would analyze from a western outlook as
naval operations. In accordance with a unified military strategy
and included naval strategic missions, the Soviets will painstak-
ingly piece together the plan that will be executed as the
engagements and strikes and maneuvers strung together to become
the Soviet naval operation. If the Soviets tailored the
boundaries close to the Norwegian coast, they would have roughly
the following possibilities for naval operations:
Coastal Northwest TVD (TSMA) : Soviet Naval Operation
1. Joint Amphibious Landings: control by army
2. Joint Amphibious Landings: control by navy
3. Combined Air Defense: control by PVO
4. Combined Air Defense: control by navy
5. Combined Air Defense: control by representatives of
General Staff.
The joint amphibious landing is a strong bet to be one of the
naval operations considered by the Soviets in the Northwestern
TVD (TSMA) in an extended conventional war. As such, the
operation is similar in essence to the joint amphibious landing
suggested as taking place in the Western TVD (TSMA) against the
Danish Baltic islands. Unlike the peripheral landing operation
in the Baltic, any significant landing in the Northwestern TVD
(TSMA) brings up questions of Soviet strategic military goals and
dependent naval strategic missions. Soviet naval operational art
— a skill manifested in the operational plan to accomplish the
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structures and missions through naval combat — proceeds in
accordance with the strategic military goal assigned to the
strategic naval missions. The question that must be analyzed is:
what would be the Soviet strategic military goals and associated
naval strategic missions in the Northwest? The answer would
probably be found among the following possibilities:
Northwestern TVD (TSMA) : Possible Soviet Strategic
Military Goals
1. Support of the Soviet Army in the Western TVD (TSMA)
.
2. Support of the Soviet Army in the seizure of the Norwegian
coast in the Northwestern TVD.
3. Support of the Soviet Army in the seizure of Finland,





Support of the PVD in the Air Defense of the Strategic
Rear.
5. Support of the Strategic Rocket Force by seizure of the
Norwegian coast and Improved Defense of the Arctic Bastion.
The Soviets have the naval strength in and around the
Northwestern TVD (TSMA) to conduct numerous types of operations
in support of the strategic goals of an extended conventional
war. The Soviets would plan and execute ends operations in order
to accomplish one or more strategic missions derived from the
above strategic military goals. The following are a few of these
high level missions:
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Northwestern TVD (TSMA) : Possible Soviet Naval Missions
1. Seize and hold the Norwegian coast from Narwik to North
Cape.
2. Seize and hold Narwik and the area around it.
3. Attack and destroy the Swedish navy in the Baltic.
4
.
Attack and destroy the Swedish and Finnish navies in the
Baltic.
The matrix in Figure One analyzes the strategic situation in
the Northwestern TVD (TSMA) in terms of the Soviet options for
running the Soviet naval operation. The matrix indicates that
only in a most indirect way can a naval operation along the
Norwegian coast or an operation against Sweden and Finland
contribute to the advance of the fronts in the Western TVD
(TSMA) . If the Soviet army forces in the Northwest have the
strategic goals of taking the Norwegian coast (north) and/or
Sweden and Finland, the matrix indicates that the Soviet navy
will conduct at least a naval landing operation along the
Norwegian coast and a naval fleet operation against the navies
and naval bases of the Swedish and Finnish navies.
As concerns a vital Soviet strategic military goal for the
PVO — the defense of the Strategic Rear from air attack over the
Northwestern TVD (TSMA) , — the matrix shows that naval opera-
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* W = West TSMA; NW = Northwest TSMA; VO = Air Defense Service;
XXX = Strategic Rocket Force
** SNO = Soviet Naval Operation (or, snow)
+ASF = Aerospace Forces (PVO)
++SRF = Strategic Rocket Forces
Figure Two. Matrix Showing Possibilities for Conducting
the Soviet Naval Operation (SNO) in the
Northwestern TVD (TSMA)
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and/or Sweden and Finland would be of great assistance. The sit-
uation would be a challenging one for the Soviet General Staff
because of the necessity to maintain the "stability" of the
Northwestern TVD (TSMA) and Scandinavia while simultaneously
assuring the air defense of the Strategic Rear. As concerns a
vital Soviet strategic military goal for the strategic rocket
force — the security and readiness of the Arctic strategic
nuclear bastion — the matrix shows that a naval fleet operation
against the Swedish and Finnish navies would be pointless. Such
a naval operation along with the advance of Soviet army forces
into Finland and Sweden could destabilize the situation possibly
to the extent of interfering with the army along the main strate-
gic axes into Western Europe. In contrast, a Soviet naval land-
ing operation on the Norwegian coast would contribute directly to
the security of the Arctic bastion by extending the Soviet sea
frontier westward along with accompanying naval and air bases and
more effective Soviet sea denial in the Norwegian Sea.
Based on several strategic goals and notwithstanding whether
or not the Soviet army would conduct an advance through Sweden
and Finland, the Soviet navy would conduct a naval amphibious
landing operation on the Norwegian coast. There would be some
question on what service, the army or the navy, would control the
operation. If, at the highest strategic level, the General Staff
decided to include Sweden and Finland in the army scheme of
maneuver, the army would probably control the landing operation
on the Norwegian coast. The navy would probably control the
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landing operation if the General Staff determined not to include
Sweden and Finland as a ground battle area but only Norway. In
either event, the Soviet navy would conduct great, predominantly
naval amphibious operations from Vardo in the north to Narvik or
possibly even Bodo in the south. In such a naval operation, the
Soviets would face a situation almost unique for them. They
would have to factor in the conduct of an almost independent
naval operation on the blue water flank of the landing not only
to protect the landing but to prevent the penetration of NATO
naval forces into the Norwegian Sea.
NATO would have a strong naval presence both in the North
Sea and the North Atlantic that would be an immediate threat to a
landing operation against Norway. NATO naval forces would also
be a threat to the naval basing area of the Northwestern TVD
(TSMA) and the Strategic Rear of the Soviet Union through
missiles and aircraft strikes over Scandinavia. And if this were
not enough, the Soviets would be imperiled in the Arctic nuclear
bastion by potential NATO naval forays or pressure through the
Norwegian and Greenland Seas. NATO normally has two carrier
battle groups in the North Atlantic armed and ready to the degree
that the Soviets would have to take account of them at the
beginning of an extended conventional war. We can assume that
the Soviets would mount a Soviet naval fleet operation with the
often noted anticarrier warfare (ACW) mission. The operation
would be a combined one with the navy clearly in control but
employing air force weapons as well as naval to defeat the
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closest or most dangerous NATO carrier battle group. In addition
to this great fleet operation, the Soviets would intensify the
day-to-day operations of the ASW forces defending the Arctic
strategic nuclear bastion and the Barents Sea naval bases. The
Soviets, similarly, would intensify day-to-day operations of the
submarine and support forces having the mission to interdict the
NATO SLOCs between North America and Europe.
In the event of a Soviet ground offensive in Central Europe,
there is not much doubt that the Soviet navy would contribute to
the fight with all of its assets in the Baltic and northern
areas. The question is: how would the Soviets organize the
naval part of the war? The answer is that they would integrate
it into the overall military strategy and apply naval operational
art to the conduct of the naval operations required to support
the strategy. Analysis above supports a conclusion that the
Soviets would plan and conduct at least three offensively
oriented naval operations. If such is the case, we should be
able to take any one of the potential operations and use it as a
vehicle to describe Soviet naval operational art and to forecast
the activity and outcome of the operations. Probably the most
important operation that the Soviets would execute would be the
ACW operation required to ensure the strategic goal of denying
the Norwegian Sea to NATO surface naval forces. The Soviets
would use the same operation to protect the naval amphibious
landing in Norway with all of its strategic goals and to support
the submarine operation against the NATO SLOCs.
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By focusing on the Soviet ACW naval operation and relating
it especially with the amphibious landing operations against
Norway, we should be able to get close to the spirit and style of
the Soviets in naval operational art. Interesting high level
considerations come into play immediately if we focus on the
Soviet principles of military and naval operational art. In the
Western TVD (TSMA) , if the Soviets decided to launch a great,
all-out offensive, they would apply above everything else the
principles of concentration and surprise and the supporting
mechanisms of deception. The Soviets, with awe-inspiring
consistency claim that war will only come through a NATO attack.
The Soviets, using the principle of military operational art
described as readiness, would immediately respond with a great,
coordinated counteroffensive of their own. We must assume,
however, that the Soviets would exploit one of innumerable
possible pretexts to claim that they were in immediate danger of
attack and launch the vaunted counteroffensive noted so often in
the literature. In effect, we must assume that the Soviets would
be capable of launching an all-out offensive which would not
necessarily be in response to any NATO attack. The end result
—
the Soviets reserve to themselves the initiative to attack
independently of any NATO action and the resultant capability to
achieve surprise in addition to concentration of effort along the
main axis of advance.
In the land war, in the Western TVD (TSMA) , the Soviet army
would move against NATO forces fixed in given ground. In the war
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in the Northwestern TVD (TSMA) , the Soviet navy would move
against NATO forces similarly fixed on a given coast. In the war
in the Arctic TVD (TSMA) , assuming the Norwegian and Greenland
Seas to be part of it, the Soviet navy would execute the naval
operation having the strategic mission to defeat the NATO carrier
task group in the vicinity of the Norwegian Sea. In succeeding
in that mission, the Soviet navy would stabilize the great
seaward flank of the ground advance in Western and Northwestern
Europe. To succeed in that mission, the Soviet navy would apply
the principles of operational art to the plan for the naval
operation against the NATO carrier task forces. As a matter of
both science and faith, the Soviets would apply the principles of
operational art. Literally first and momentarily foremost among
the principles in any offensive is that os surprise. The Soviets
would labor to achieve surprise. How would they do this at sea?
The Soviets would face a fundamental stumbling block in
achieving surprise not unlike the interservice problems faced by
the Germans at the beginning of a similar great conventional
offensive. In German Barbarossa, the following debate over the
timing of the attack developed between army and air force,
elements of which are analogous to the Soviet situation in any
great offensive today: the German army insisted on attacking at
first light and prior to the crossing of the border by aircraft
of the air force; the air force pointed out that under such
circumstances with its targets located well within Soviet Russia,
the Soviet air force would be forewarned and the air attack fail
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to catch the Soviet air force deployed in peacetime aspect on the
ground; the German army completed this fundamental quandry by
noting the complete validity of the air force argument but
emphasizing that as the attacking aircraft roared over the
border, the Soviet ground forces would be alerted and the German
army would fail utterly to achieve tactical surprise with the
resultant possible strategic failure.
For the Soviets, on the maritime flank, the question would
be one of timing between the navy on the flank and the army in
Central Europe. Soviet military operational art dictates the
achievement of surprise both at sea, through application of naval
operational art, and on land. In Central Europe, on land, fixed
geographic ground terrain would predetermine front axes of
advance and the location of the defense. Under these circum-
stances, the attacking Soviet ground forces would have the
opportunity to attack almost any time of its choosing using a
wide range of deception to contribute to surprise. In stark
contrast, the naval "terrain" of the North Atlantic permits a
deployed NATO carrier battle group to be virtually anywhere and
constantly on the move. Through the use of deception, the
Soviets might be able to achieve temporarily a concentration of
Soviet naval forces about and around a NATO carrier battle group.
If the Soviets could time this to take place when the carrier
group was well within the Norwegian Sea, they could add a special
additional concentration of aviation and patrol boat assets that
could achieve an annihilating massed strike against a firmly
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located carrier battle group. It is difficult to imagine the
Soviets successfully orchestrating such a situation. Add the
necessity for naval operational art to time the situation to
occur simultaneously with the army selection of the best time for
an attack on the ground in Central Europe, and we must admit the
practical impossibility of the Soviets achieving tactical
surprise simultaneously at sea and on the ground.
What would the Soviets do in such a quandry? Use of the
historical method is valuable to begin to answer this query. In
Barbarossa, the German army, the senior German service attacked
at first light simultaneously with the overflight of the Soviet
Russian border by the massed first wave of the German aerial
strike. Even the powerful political figure, Hermann Goering, and
his special support of the Luftwaffe could not accomplish a
timing of the attack more favorable to the German air force. The
historical lesson, albeit supported by only one historical "data
point" — the army of a continental power set the timing of a
great surprise offensive to the potential disastrous detriment of
a sister service. The army and Luftwaffe worked together to
overcome the fundamental contradiction, as follows, and achieved
in the actual offensive about as much success as conceivable.
The Luftwaffe trained an elite element of 50 aircraft bomber
crews in night navigation to overfly the Soviet border in full
darkness and attack the target richest and most dangerous Soviet
air fields simultaneously with the attack of the army at first
light. In addition to this tactical stratagem and tactical
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surprise, the Germans surprised the Soviets technically with the
first massed employment of cluster bomblets — the German SD-
2 weapons. The historical case suggests that the Soviet army
would dictate the timing of the attack even though a unified
military strategy would be functioning, and that the Soviet navy
would substantially overcome its problem of timing to achieve
surprise.
In support of an army offensive in the Western TVD (TSMA)
and the necessary defeat of the Strategic Rear and the naval
strategic nuclear rocket forces in the Arctic bastion, the navy
would mount an ACW operation in which surprise would be the
single most important factor in the destruction of the carrier
battle group (or groups) at the beginning of a war. In planning
the ACW operation at the Atlantic edge of the Arctic Oceanic TVD
(TSMA) , the Soviets would employ what they would term as a
scientific approach including the systematic application of the
principles of naval operational art. The naval commander of the
largely independent ACW operation and his staff would end up
working in the Soviet framework presented in Figure Two.
In this framework, the Soviet commander of the prospective
naval operation would get a lot of scientifically styled,
mathematical assistance from the general and special staffs
around him to include even mathematical probabilities of the
chances of success in projected strikes, engagements, and
maneuvers. The Soviet naval commander would be particularly
sensitive to the overall correlation of forces and means in the
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The General Staff Marching Orders ;
Defining of Strategic Military Objectives ; Deny Norwegian
Sea to NATO carrier task forces to support army offensive in west
and to defend Strategic Rear and Arctic nuclear bastion.
Defining of Naval Strategic Mission ; Defeat NATO carrier
battle groups in North Atlantic.
The Naval Operation (Planning) ;
Naval Commander's Decisions
Naval staff's estimate of situation.
Naval staff's correlation of forces and means.
Naval commander's concept of the operation (applica-
tion of the principles of naval operational art)
.
Naval staff's substantiation of the commander's concept
(application of the science and system of probability, queuing
theory, game theory)
.
Naval commander's decision (application of the




Operational Support Plan (Deception, Logistics)
Operation Plan and Resultant Operation Order
The Naval Operation (Execution) ; The naval commander
executes the engagements, strikes, and maneuvers that comprise
the naval operation and are directed toward the accomplishment of
the naval strategic mission.
Figure Three. Systematic Soviet Framework for the Assignment,
Planning, and Execution of the Naval ACW
Operation, Arctic TVD, Area Greenland-U.K. Gap
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zone of operations. He would make demands through the Northern
Fleet to the General Staff for reinforcement and even changes in
missions in accordance with his evaluation of the naval balance
of forces. Outside of this initial fundamental evaluation of the
overall balance of force in the zone of operations, the Soviet
naval commander would probably arrive at a concept of operations
based largely on his personal experience of fleet exercises,
reading of military and naval history, and resultant vicarious
experience of war itself. In effect, the Soviet command would be
bound largely by consideration of the principles of naval
operational art, and he would apply based on his "sense" of
reality in the success of the combat engagements, strikes, and
maneuvers planned by him.
Constrained by a unified military goal and subject to almost
complete dependence on the army for the time of beginning of the
war, the naval commander would be forced to extract everything
possible from the principles of naval operational art in
conceptualizing, planning, and executing the naval operation.
Unfortunately, the Great Fatherland War does not give us a nicely
analogous case of extreme blue water naval operations on a
maritime flank by Soviet naval forces. The Soviet naval
operations in the Black and Baltic Seas were severely limited in
scope, conducted against nonexistent (Black Sea) or relatively
weak (Baltic Sea) naval forces, and conditioned by the immediate
convenience of the army along a gray water coast. We can use the
Great Fatherland War with a little imagination, to provide us
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with valuable clues to the Soviet Russian mentality in naval
situations.
Particularly in its big amphibious operations, the Soviet
navy displayed a natural aptitude for cunning, resultant
deception, achievement of surprise, and effective concentration
of effort. We can detect in the Soviet Russian style an
intriguing boldness and tactical aggressiveness lying right
alongside of very different formalism and rigidity in military
and naval operations. The personality of the Soviet naval
commander would be probably the key factor in breaking the code
of the ACW naval operation in the Arctic TVD (TSMA) at the
beginning of a conventional offensive in the Western TVD (TSMA)
.
Given the general mission that he would have to deny the
Norwegian Sea to NATO carrier battle groups, a bold, pugnacious
Soviet naval commander could practice a variety of deceptions
(camouflage, misinformation, and feints) , new tactics and weapons
for naval use, and choice of axis or even location of attack that
would force NATO carrier battle groups into an exploitable
reaction.
What parts of Soviet naval operational art would encourage
the Soviet naval commander to exploit the initiative associated
with the decisive seizing of the initiative by the army in a
surprise attack in the west? Soviet naval operational art
demands the practice of deception and the achievement of surprise
but how can these factors be applied in a military strategic
situation in which the timing of the beginning of the war lies
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with the army in its ground attack against fixed NATO armies in
Central Europe?
In the North Atlantic, at the edge of the Arctic TVD (TSMA),
the Soviets could work initially against ground terrain rather
than against elusive, mobile carrier task forces forcing the
latter into maneuver and action that could be anticipated by the
Soviets and converted into the destruction of the carriers. The
bold and unexpected seizure of Iceland at the same time as the
advance into West Germany and landings along the Norwegian coast
would be a dramatic surprise in terms of the axis of advance and
the methods necessary to seize the place guickly. The seizure of
iceland could be timed effectively with the other ground and
amphibious operations unlike a strike against NATO carrier battle
groups at sea. For many fundamental reasons the great surprise
naval strikes at the beginning of a war (or against neutrals)
have been against naval forces "immobilized" in port, e.g.,
British against Danes at Copenhagen (1805), Japanese against
Russians at Port Arthur (1904), and Japanese against Americans at
Pearl Harbor (1941). By the surprise seizure of Iceland, the
Soviets would not only deny the approaches to the Norwegian Sea
to NATO but force its carrier battle groups into precipitate
action at a time and place of Soviet choosing where naval ambush
and other Soviet stratagems and actions could be prepared in
advance. Diagram One illustrates the way in which Soviet naval
operational art would develop under such circumstances complete







A CONVENTIONAL WARFARE SCENARIO
SOVIET EMIGRE COMMENTARY
The Soviet naval operation with the ACW strategic mission
described in the preceding chapter could be identified as the
advanced sea denial maneuver with the Iceland opening gambit.
Within the super scenario of an extended conventional war between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets would be impelled to deny
the Norwegian Sea to NATO carrier group operations and would
almost certainly mount a naval ACW operation as part of the
effort to do so. The scenario is considered, therefore, to be
realistic in general and reasonable in detail. The scenario is
not intended to compete with any other in the sense of being the
operation that the Soviets would embrace in the event of war.
The scenario is intended as a means to get further into the
mentality of the Soviets in conducting a naval operation and
applying the skill of naval operational art. In order to verify
the reasonableness of the generalities offered about Soviet naval
operational art in the previous chapter, the primary researcher
solicited the impressions of a Soviet emigre — native-born
Russian, exceptionally well-educated, service as commissioned
officer in the Soviet army, sensitive to the make-up of the
Russian character.
The Soviet expert was read into the general scenario and
introduced to the point that the navy's ACW fleet operation in
VI-1
the Arctic TVD (TSMA) would have timing subject to the
operational necessities of the army in Central Europe. He agreed
with the argument that it would be extremely difficult for the
navy to achieve surprise against a maneuvering "inherently" alert
NATO naval force at sea and almost impossible in the event the
Soviet navy would not pick the time of attack. Faced with
commenting on a situation in which the Soviet navy would face an
enormous initial disadvantage in conducting a fleet operation in
an ocean TVD (TSMA) , the Soviet expert commented that such a
situation was not unusual and that in any theater of war, the
Soviets would "tilt the effort" toward the decisive instrument.
The expert made it clear that the question was not one of navy
versus army but of the operations being conducted and the overall
"environment" of the war. For the expert, it was evident that
the ground attack in the Western TVD (TSMA) could lead quickly to
the occupation of the entire continent of Europe. No naval
operation could accomplish the equivalent.
The Soviet expert went on to elaborate that the Russians
have had centuries long experience of problems with productive
resources. The Russians have faced a unique combination of
scanty natural resources changing to a surfeit but always chronic
weaknesses in production either because of outright backwardness
or more subtle, self-defeating authoritarian political controls.
As a result, the Russians have had to make hard choices. It is
easy for the Russians to set priorities; it is natural for them
to enforce priorities. The Soviet navy could scarcely be
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surprised at receiving a lower priority for its fleet ACW
operation in the environment of a land war close to the western
border of the Soviet Union.
In terms of naval operational art, the Soviet navy would
face the absolute necessity to achieve surprise in its fleet
naval operation. No greater opportunity can exist to exploit
surprise than at the beginning of a war under the very special
circumstances of a surprise offensive out of the political
situation of peace and into war. Faced with mounting a naval
fleet operation within the framework of a war "tilted" in timing
and space toward the ground offensive in Central Europe, the Navy
would require special stratagems indeed to achieve some element
of surprise leading to the defeat of the NATO carrier battle
groups deployed in the North Atlantic at a time chosen according
to the dictates of a non-naval environment. The Soviet expert
had a ready answer for the Soviet Russian mentality in such a
situation; the Soviets would "outsmart" their opponents. They
would achieve essentially a grand "mental surprise" against NATO
opponents whom they continue to gauge as superior technicians.
Having already been introduced to the Iceland gambit, the Soviet
expert considered it well within the Soviet Russian style to
apply cunning (hedrost) and elaborate camouflage (masjkiroyjca) to
the bold, surprise seizure of Iceland.
The Soviet expert implied in the arguments above and went on
to state directly that the Soviet style in surprise emphasizes
outsmarting an opponent rather than springing breakthroughs in
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military technology. The statement suggests the generalization
that cunning and camouflage in Soviet deception and associated
surprise in Soviet naval operational art, will be tactically
oriented somewhat more than technically. It is well known, of
course, that the Soviets place special emphasis on scientific
technology and have come to match the west fairly closely in
military technology. The point is that the Russian historical
condition and Soviet technology have combined in Soviet naval
operational art to make cunning and hiding uniquely important.
This special importance is difficult to understand from a western
perspective. This difficulty is also compounded since the
Soviets will use sophisticated electronic camouflage at sea to
achieve what they consider to be important, albeit primitive,
tactical surprise.
The warning in accepting such a generalization is that the
Soviets would take any opportunity presented to them to spring
technological surprise in combat. The Soviets, for example, in
the Great Fatherland War claim an element of technical surprise
and superiority over the Germans that matched any other factor in
importance for the repulse of the enemy at Moscow in December
1941. The Soviets claim the T-34 main battle tank as that
element of technical surprise and few can doubt its importance i
the fighting from October-December 1941. The T-34, however, was
designed largely in an evolutionary sense as the follow-on
vehicle to a large mass of Soviet cavalry-style tanks with severe
weaknesses in armor protection. The Soviets produced a tank that
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proved to be "revolutionary" in design but the Soviets never
intended that effect. Even in the case of the defense of Moscow,
therefore, we see the Soviets being lucky in the earlier German
misdirection of effort away from Moscow and skillful tactically
and operationally in saving enough forces and mobilizing others
to survive in 1941. This historical sketch suggests that even in
the case of the T-34, the Soviets did not intend the tank to be a
special element of technical surprise and that the Soviet style
in combat revolved more around cunning, a mania for the
preservation of reserves no matter what the crisis, ruthless
suborning of all assets, etc. — essentially tactical factors and
large numbers of good weapons.
The Soviet expert continued in the case of a surprise
seizure of Iceland that the Soviets had the deceptive skills to
achieve surprise in air and sea landings. He agreed also that
they had the tactical skills in combat to make the seizure
largely assured in a coup de main at the beginning of a war. In
a nice insight into potential Soviet mentality in war, the Soviet
expert elaborated that the big issue for the Soviets in naval
operational art would be whether or not they could hold Iceland
successfully. The primary researcher pointed out that the issue
for Soviet naval operational art was not one of holding Iceland
as if it were a continentally styled piece of ground terrain but
as a lure to force the NATO carrier battle groups into a
precipitous, predictable counterattack that the Soviets would
exploit into quick destruction of the carriers. Such destruction
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would include surprise fires from Soviet ground and air forces
deployed on Iceland and from commercial vessels sited in the
fjords.
If and when the Soviets destroyed the initially deployed
NATO carrier battle groups and the Soviet ground forces defeated
the NATO ground forces on the continent of Europe, the Soviets
would almost certainly make the decision to hold on to Iceland
and probably be successful. If the Soviet ground forces failed
to defeat the NATO ground forces on the continent, the General
Staff would face a great decision of whether to attempt to hold
it in the face of a massive buildup of NATO naval forces in the
North Atlantic or fight hard, but cut its losses and sacrifice
the forces on the island. The Soviet expert commented
unhesitatingly that the Soviets would sacrifice the forces in a
hard fight, pinning down NATO forces as long as possible. The
Soviet expert argued in a thought-provoking metaphor that the
Russians are chess players and in chess you sacrifice. The
following roughly analogous historical situation suggests itself
in support of the expert opinon that the Soviets have a style of
sacrificing: In June and July 1942, the Soviets faced final
defeat in an exposed "island" of resistance — the fortress of
Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. The Soviets had been
fighting an incredibly stubborn but losing battle since the
isolation of the fortress in November 1941. The Soviet General
Staff determined to sacrifice the troops and civilians in the
fortress in the interests of delaying the German offensive
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building in the south during the first half of 1942. The Soviet
sacrifice of man and fortress is exemplified by fighting on 29
June 1942 in which the German 50th Infantry Division advanced
over the Inkerman Heights, and the Soviet military commanders and
political commissars in vast champagne cellars on the western
slopes instead of surrendering after a battle lost, set off an
explosion that collapsed 90 feet of rock over a length of 900
yards burying thousands of combat troops, wounded, and civilians.
The style was one of sacrifice within a sacrifice.
In a general overview of naval warfare on the seaward flank
of the Western TVD (TSMA) , the Soviet expert tied together some
inciteful observations on Soviet strategy and operations in the
Baltic, Scandinavia, and out into the northern seas. He stated
emphatically that the Soviet Russians with their conservative,
heavy, continentally conditioned historical style could not
accept the uncertainties and dangers of a neutral Sweden and
Finland in a conventional war in the west. The Soviets simply
could not stomach the vagaries of 750,000 well-armed Western
Europeans in so critical a location as Sweden. Neutrality,
diplomatic agreement, etc., would be unacceptable to the Soviets
in an all-out conventional war. The expert gauged the Soviet
strategic mind as one that would demand a free rein in
Scandinavia and the operational style as one in which the Soviets
would not allow the mobilization of the Swedish armed forces.
With the latter consideration, the Soviets could not mount their
main operation through Finnmark; it would take so long to develop
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into Sweden and come from such a direction that the Swedes would
be able to effect mobilization and present effective resistance.
The Soviet expert sees the Soviets demanding something more
direct, quicker, immediately paralyzing and presenting great
strategic possibilities.
Based on the strategic premise that the Soviets would have
to take Sweden and the operational premise that they would
prevent Swedish mobilization, the Soviet expert sees the
possibility of a naval landing operation directed straight at
Stockholm. The landing force would have three great strategic
missions. It would seize Stockholm immediately to disrupt the
national command authority. It would direct forces along
multiple axes into the heaviest populated areas to paralyze the
Swedish mobilization. It would project a mobile force styled
like an operational maneuver group out of the large amphibious
bridgehead. The mobile force would advance through Sweden and
then along two final axes into the Oslo area essentially breaking
into the "soft underbelly" of Norway from a dramatically
surprising direction. These projections are certainly
interesting but what about their reality?
Two foremost questions can be asked to test the reality of
Soviet naval operations against South Central Sweden. The first
is: would the Soviets launch a campaign in Scandinavia that
would possibly destabilize the Northwestern TVD (TSMA) to the
detriment of the advance in Central Europe? The dilemma would be
a cruel one with a tough campaign against the Swedes having to be
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balanced against the uncertain dangers from a powerful neutral
force in a strategic location. The Soviet expert is probably
right; the Soviets would be driven to tidy up things in
Scandinavia. The second question concerns the operational
capabilities of the Soviet navy, army, and air force in a major
landing operation. Would the Soviets have enough strength in men
and weapons and the skill especially in naval operational art to
apply to the Swedish landing? Almost instinctively, the Soviet
expert commented that perhaps the main strength of the Soviets
was relentless emphasis on numbers and that the men, weapons, and
shipping would not be an obstacle to the strategy.
The question of naval operational art is quite another. The
army would be the controlling service in a Swedish operation but
the navy would be more critical even than the army on the issue
of the technical and tactical importance of its operations. In
terms of the skill of operational art, the navy would be
responsible almost entirely for successful deception, the
achievement of surprise in the entire operation, and the buildup
ashore of ground forces fast enough so that the army could carry
out its vast set of raiding-like operations — the coup de main
in downtown Stockholm, the advances into the Swedish mobilization
areas, and the seizure and holding of Oslo for follow-up forces.
In effect, the navy would be responsible for the concentration of
forces for the operation and the "breakthrough attack," which the
successful seizure of an adequate bridgehead ashore would
represent in an amphibious operation. The army, in effect, would
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be the force that would exploit naval deception and surprise and
the concentration of specialized naval infantry in the successful
seizure of a beachhead ashore.
With the immensely important strategic mission to effect a
landing that would have the strategic goal to take Sweden and
Norway out of the war within days, the navy would be bound to a
classical application of naval operational art. The Soviet navy,
for example, would have to deceive both the Swedes and NATO into
believing that in the event of an extended conventional war that
Sweden would not be a Soviet target but that naval activity
including important landings could be expected against he Danish
islands. In the bold and challenging Kerch-Feodosiya landings of
December 1941, the Red Navy of the day disguised the
concentration of forces and movements of shipping for the
landings as part of the effort to reinforce the powerful Soviet
forces besieged at Sevastopol. A similar application of navy
operational art would take place in the Baltic. Not everything
would be generally similar to this valuable historical case. In
the Kerch-Feodosiya episode, for example, the Soviets succeeded
in deception and surprise by strong landings around Kerch that
forced the Germans to fight hard and rivet their attention there.
Two days later, the Soviets landed even stronger forces at
Feodosiya far to the west, achieving a devastating surprise as
concerns the location of the main axis of the attack. In the
hypothesized Swedish landing operation, the Soviets would have no
such "luxury" in deception through delay of the major attack
—
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literally every hour would count in developing the attack inland




SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART:
APPLICATION TO THE RED SIDE OF WESTERN WAR GAMES
The Soviet naval operation is a higher level form of Soviet
naval warfare that strings together combat strikes, engagements
and maneuvers into a purposeful series of actions designed to
achieve centrally designated, unified Soviet strategic military
goals. The Soviets apply the skill of Soviet naval operational
art in the planning of the naval operation and the execution of
the combat actions and maneuvers that make it up. The Soviets
will conduct naval warfare according to the dictates of naval
operational art which is a skill that emphasizes principles,
methods, factors, processes, directed by a scientific, systematic
approach and historical style different from that in the west.
The fact that the Soviet Russians and many of the nationalities
now controlled by them "think" differently in their approach to
fighting wars has caused some to characterize it as unfathomable
and subject to erratic change not unlike the movement of an
untethered, wheeled gun carriage on the deck of former vessels of
war at sea. But different is not necessarily unintelligible, and
Soviet naval operational art has been described, lauded,
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characterized, and painted in historical example by the Soviets
enough to make it no longer a mystery. ^
In the 1980s, strategic war gaming has become popular in the
United States due to the evident lack of realism of mathematical
models and computer simulations of theater and global war
fighting situations. Strategic war games include theater and
global war games, strategy assessment games, and broad, high
level political-military seminar games. Strategic war games have
several purposes including the education of the human actors
taking part in them in the processes of decision making in
simulated crisis. The most important practical purpose of the
strategic war game is to assist in the planning of anticipated
military operations globally and at the theater level. As one of
the most important available tools in planning for war, the
strategic war game can have crucial impact on the initial stages
of wars fought under plans validated by the games. Blue or
friendly side actors in war games will accurately portray their
own forces and style although the plans derived from the games
may still lead to military defeat. Red or enemy side actors in
war games present a different case. Blue actors necessarily will
represent Red side with increased opportunity for the input of
unrealistic numbers, weapon performance characteristics, and
command style, and the vastly increased possibility of faulty
^-For this metaphor, see Lieutenant Arthur Scott Mobley, Jr.,
Beyond the Black Box : An Assessment of Strategic War Gaming .
Naval Postgraduate School Master's Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1987), p. 64.
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plans. Relatively ill understood at present, the Soviet naval
operation is orchestrated through the skill of Soviet naval
operational art and demands understanding if strategic war games
involving naval warfare are to be valid.
The search then is for the things that characterize Soviet
naval operational art. The purpose of the search is to take the
factors that characterize naval operational art and hang them out
as warning and lessons before the western human actors engaged in
strategic war games. First, the warning.
The Soviets conduct naval warfare with weapons, weapon
platforms, and combat tactics similar to those in the west. The
Soviets practice military strategy similarly to the way that it
is practiced in the west in terms of rational, coordinated
strategic goals and missions. The first warning of real
difference in form comes with the Soviet declaration that there
is no naval strategy. What the west would present as naval
strategy the Soviets designate as the theory of the navy. With
claim of scientific superiority, they elaborate on the point that
there can be only one central, unified military strategy and
create the pedantic category of the Soviet theory of the navy in
place of a Soviet naval strategy. At this point of fundamental
similarity between Soviet and western tactics and pedantic
difference between strategy, a warning sign must be hoisted.
Pontifically, the Soviets claim a fundamental new category of
military art — military operational art — the naval version of
which is naval operational art. Any war game with a naval
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scenario that fails to factor in Soviet naval operational art
will be subject to catastrophic failure in any purpose that it
might have — education of participants, discovery of new
perspectives, and most important, development of plans for war.
The Soviet naval operation is created and played out by
Soviet naval operational art. The special characteristics of the
art stand out in the following qualifying highlights:
Soviet Naval Operational Art, Inputs . Red Side .
Strategic War Games
* Input Cunning (hedrost ) to contribute to Deception.
* Input Camouflage (maskirovka ) to contribute to Deception.
* Input Deception to contribute to Surprise.
* Input Surprise (exploits friendly initiatives)
.
* Input Readiness (defends against enemy initiative)
.
* Input Correlation of Forces and Means.
* Input Concentration of Forces and Means (joint landing
operations)
.
* Input Massing of Strikes (independent, combined, or combined
fleet operations)
.
* Input Unified Strategic Military Goals.
* Input Militarily Synchronized Naval Strategic Mission.
In any strategic war game that contains a naval warfare
scenario in which the Soviets are on the offensive, the
controlling agent of the game must construct a Soviet naval
operation in which the Soviets practice deception and achieve
surprise. By doing this, the controlling agent will not only
accurately portray the immense initial disability of the side
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giving up the initiative but also realistically present the
historical reality that the attacker who attempts to achieve
surprise will virtually always succeed. In conducting the ACW
naval operation as part of an advance of the Soviet army into the
Western TVD (TSMA) , the Soviet navy could conduct an included
landing on Iceland that would have elements of strategic,
operational (for the Soviets) and tactical surprise in it. The
cunning stratagem and masking of attacking forces would include
the seizure of the airport at Keflavik by special operations
forces (SPETSNAZ) in Soviet commercial airliners, reinforcement
by air landed troops in Il-76/Candide and An-22/Cock transport
aircraft flying straight out of the Soviet Union and supported by
additional combat and logistical support forces and means
deployed hidden in commercial and special fishing vessels. 2
Historical precedent here can be found both in the Soviet seizure
of Prague international airport (1978) and the bold, direct
German attack on Norway (1940) . The purpose of the landing
described above would be to contribute directly as part of a
greater ACW naval operation to the defeat of the NATO carrier
battle groups in the North Atlantic.
Control agents in strategic war games in which the Soviets
are on the offensive against western forces must include in
principle achievement of surprise and the appropriate
improvements in strategic position and the inflicting of damage
2Note the range of 4,200 km with full payload of 175 troops
or 80 tons of material for the An-22/Cock and similar performance
for the 11-76 Candid.
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by Red side. Such a situation must be jarring because the
achievement of surprise presupposes the strong possibility of
defeat on the part of the defending NATO forces. Soviet naval
operational art, however, is both bold and conservative. If the
Soviets have decided to attack and have used bold stratagems,
they have done so after conservative consideration of the
correlation of forces and convinced themselves of substantial
probabilities of success. Control agents in war games in which
the Soviets are on the defensive must consider that the unigue
Soviet principle of naval operational art defined as readiness
will be operating. Readiness is the unusual Soviet defensive
running mate of surprise. Extraordinarily sensitive about the
prospect of being surprised at the beginning of any war, the
Soviets beat on the theme to include ultra-sensitivity on the
defensive to western accomplishment of surprise. This unigue
principle of Soviet naval operational art — readiness — is a
warning. Control agents in war games must take account of
special difficulties for Blue forces achieving surprise against
the Soviet navy.
The Soviets consider cunning, camouflage, deception and
surprise as important in the naval operation because they are
methods and principles that contribute to concentration of effort
along the main axis of the attack. These words have a military,
ground forces ring to them because of the unified nature of
Soviet military art. The issue is not so much that the army will
predominate in extended conventional war but that a scientific,
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systematic, unified set of principles of military art must apply
to all services. The Soviets express the naval version of
concentration of forces along a physical avenue of movement in
terms of the massing of strikes along the least defended
direction of attack. In a no-nonsense, Clausewitzean style, the
Soviets feel that only armed combat brings victory in war. The
Soviets in turn translate armed combat in the naval operation
into the surprise, massed strike of the missiles, aircraft, and
torpedoes of the Soviet naval force independent or combined with
formation of the other branches of the armed forces.
Just massing fires is not enough for the Soviets. They
demand that their naval forces mass fires by surprise along
unsuspected directions of attack so effectively as to preempt the
fires of the opposing naval forces. We cannot fault the Soviets
for having these objectives; such results arr a consummation
devoutly to be desired. We suspect the worst in naive optimism
on the part of the Soviets in believing that the can bring
together results such as these in the naval zone of operations.
Yet there is a certain intensity in the arguments and the Soviets
go on in a grinding, banal manner to demand that their naval
forces initially concentrate on the destruction of western
reconnaissance and observation assets. The Soviets intend to
keep their own reconnaissance forces intact and achieve the first
massed strike so crucial to naval forces engaged at long ranges
with accurate, lethal missiles. All of this is not just talk, it
is Soviet naval operational art. The control agent in the
VII-7
strategic war game must factor in on Red side in the naval part
of the scenario, the stubborn energy and bold ingenuity on the
part of the Soviets to achieve this result.
The Soviet naval operation is part of a team play. The
Soviets pride themselves on scientific and systematic unification
of military doctrine and military art. In war, the Soviets will
fight with a unified military strategy that will dictate the
naval strategic mission to be accomplished by the skill of naval
operational art. The Soviet naval operation constructed by naval
operational art will fit into the bigger picture of Soviet
military strategy. The operation will be predictable for those
who have broken the code of centralization and unification. In
the popular scenario of a Soviet army offensive in Central Europe
as part of an extended conventional war, the Soviet navy would
conduct a major landing operation in the Baltic in support of the
army in the Western TVD (TSMA) . The Soviet navy would conduct an
even more important landing operation along the Norwegian coast
in support of military goals assigned to the army in the
Northwestern TVD (TSMA) particularly in the event that the
central Soviet military strategy demanded the seizure of
Scandinavia to stabilize the Northwestern TVD (TSMA) as a vital
contribution to several other goals. Even if the army were not
assigned the goal to seize Finland and Scandinavia, the navy
would conduct the same naval landing operation against Norway in
support of geographically integrated strategic military goals of
the PVO, strategic rocket force, and the navy itself. The
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control agent of the strategic war game must recognize the
predictability of the Soviet naval operation and factor in those





IDEAS ABOUT SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART
At higher levels of thought, the Soviets define military
strategy as the "upper spectrum" of military art encompassing the
theory and practice of preparing the country and the armed forces
for war as well as planning and conducting the war and strategic
operations in it. 1 For the Soviets, there is a supporting theory
of military strategy which is a system of scientific knowledge
that examines the conditions of war, the methods for conducting
it, and the carrying out of strategic operations. The Soviets
elaborate especially that military strategy is closely linked to
politics, results from it and serves it. The Soviets tend to
focus at a high level when conceptualizing and applying strategy
as exemplified in V.I. Lenin's words that "strategy is
subordinate to politics, and one is inseparably linked to the
other." 2 Beat upon by words like these, we could become
suspicious that what the Soviets call strategy we would
designate: grand strategy.
In the Soviet Union, the communist party (CPSU) and the
government overlap almost completely and the two entities control
the country through centralized state planning, for example, the
famed multiyear economic plans. As concerns defense and the all
l-ONI, SME, Naval, I, entry: Military Strategy.
2 Ibid.
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important war planes, it is no surprise that military strategy
will be very close to the highest level political considerations.
With a hard-hearted, continentally conditioned mentality, the
CPSU and the government are sensitive to security and determined
to develop centrally all resources of the state in the interests
of defense. Even more important, the CPSU will practice extreme
controls in order to maintain itself in political power. This
practice of control will be accentuated in the case of the
militarily disciplined armed defense forces more than any
technical social elite in the state. The unique CPSU emphasis on
control demands that Soviet military strategy be a very high
level, politically influenced system of thinking both in order to
bend all assets to the interests of state survival against
foreign attack and to assure the predominance of the party
internally. With these considerations driving it, Soviet
military strategy will be like western grand strategy, i.e.,
something rather different from U.S. military strategy but
similar to what we would refer to as grand strategy.
How does this interpretation of Soviet military strategy
help us to understand Soviet naval operational art? With
military strategy set in the Soviet Union at the higher political
and military levels, we see a wide gap between this politically
styled "military" strategy and the tactical combat of war. With
so general an outlook on strategy, it is not surprising that the
party and the interrelated higher command of the armed forces
would find it necessary to link such strategy with tactics. For
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the CPSU, the link would add another layer of control over the
armed forces in a state characterized as accommodating a
transmission belt society. For the Soviet ruling elite, a body
characterized perhaps as "the bureaucracy," operational art would
be a peculiarly Soviet adjustment in a society that rejects
spontaneity. For the more senior commanders in the Soviet armed
forces, military and naval operational art represents an element
of strict paternalistically styled control required to keep a
huge, severely inhibited, and sometimes fearful body of troops in
line and on course. Even more important for the military
commanders in the armed forces, naval and military operational
art represents the necessary skill and activity to coordinate
battles, engagements, strikes, and maneuvers into a linked set of
tactical actions capable of achieving naval or military strategic
goals. Interestingly enough, U.S. officers would describe such
activity under the heading of strategy and do so naturally and
without the tone of scientific hysteria found in Soviet
descriptions of naval operational art.
These very general observations suggest that the following
contrasting situation exists between Soviet and U.S. thinking
about the levels of action in war.
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Contrasting Soviet-U.S. Levels of Action in War
Soviet U.S.
Soviet Military Strategy U.S. Grand Strategy
Soviet Theory of the Navy -
Soviet Naval Operational Art U.S. Naval Strategy
Soviet Naval Tactics U.S. Naval Tactics
The Soviets conceptualize that faced with modern economic
productive forces and the political-social phenomenon of
conscription, the art of naval warfare produced a new form of
fleet combat activity — the naval operation. Modern economies
and the phenomenon of huge peacetime standing armies and greater
mobilized forces produced the spectacle of large, mixed naval
forces of surface combat vessels combined with submarine, torpedo
boats, destroyers (of torpedo boats) , cruisers, and naval
aircraft. Referencing this "scientific" analysis of changes in
naval warfare, the Soviets claim to have applied further
scientific analysis to the creation of the Soviet naval operation
and the orchestrating skill of naval operational art. The
Soviets note, for example, that they began to use the term
"operational art" in 1922, and they formally articulated military
and naval art into strategy, operational art, and tactics in
192 6. 3 In the west, in contrast, the United States has not
developed a theory of naval operational art to the present day,
and the West Germans, who inherited the highest reputation for
3Soviet Union, MED, VI, pp. 2148, 2149
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the conduct of war at the operational level, continue to address
it in a fluid, historical style in contrast to stiff Soviet
emphasis on numbers, equations, and claims of scientific "rigor."
Again, based on such argument, we must suspect that the Soviets
embraced operational art partly — perhaps even largely — as a
means to the ends of more effective political and high level
military control over the armed forces and more effective "troop
control" by the higher level military commanders in war.
Touted by the Soviets as a scientific response to a
systematically analyzed historical situation, naval operational
art may represent more accurately a political-social control
syndrome on the part of the Soviet Russians. Instead of being
understood as military science and system, Soviet naval
operational art might be approached more effectively as
authoritarian bureaucratic controls by Russians in the cassocks
of modern Soviet communists. As such it would represent a
peculiarity of the Soviet Union rather than part of a necessary
scientific development of modern military "art." Either way, as
science or political-social control, naval operational "art" is a
powerful tool in the hands of the west for predicting Soviet
courses of action in naval warfare. The plan for the naval
operation, particularly as influenced by the elements of
political control and military paternalism, will be infallible.
It must be right if it is passed down by higher authority. It
can fail only if it is misunderstood or misapplied by subordinate
commanders. As part of the necessary military rules of the game,
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the Soviets would have to apply the war fighting principles of
naval operational art — readiness, surprise, massing, coordina-
tion, maneuver, etc. — with unquestioning consistency.
These elements of scientific system, political control, and
senior officer paternalism and pedantry combine to make Soviet
naval operational art predictable; acknowledged principles are
applied along with known methods to assure their successful
application. Concentration, for example, is probably the single
most important principle of Soviet military operational art. In
the navy, this principle takes the form of the massing of strikes
against the strongest opposing fleet targets and is directly
served by most of the other principles notably surprise,
coordination, and maneuver. Reflecting their preoccupation with
science, the Soviets will apply numbers and mathematics
(algorithms or algebraic equations) in the initial stages of the
planning of the naval operation. The numbers and equations are
put together to systematically establish the correlation of
forces between the Soviet navy and an opponent in the zone of
operations. The Soviets consider this correlation of forces as
de rigeur in the planning phase of naval operational art and use
it to gauge the possibilities of achieving the massing of strikes
against an opponent in a successful enough manner to achieve
assigned strategic missions.
Western naval commanders and staffs make similar estimates
but in a less pretentious style. The estimates are important in
the west. When the Soviets add elements of control, paternalism,
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and pedantry, the correlations of force becomes more than
important to them; they become mandatory to be calculated and
once calculated become infallible rules for action or inaction.
The Soviets advise their commanders that correlations of forces
are guides and that the commander must bring to bear his
experience, judgment, etc., to make a final decision. It is
difficult to imagine a Soviet commander, however, making a
decision to launch an offensive naval operation without an
appropriate correlation of force. Because naval forces are more
difficult to conceal physically at sea and more difficult to
deploy secretly out of port, the naval correlation will probably
be a surer guide than most activities in ground TVDs (TSMAs) that
a crisis in peacetime is developing into war. The surest guide
to potential Soviet action may be the predictable emphasis in
Soviet naval operational art on correlation of force and
concentration of effort. Notwithstanding what the ground balance
may appear to be at any time, given the Soviet penchant for
unified strategy, the naval correlation would probably be the
ultimate danger sign of impending Soviet attack to all western
forces in the potential theater of war.
In the greatest surprise military offensive of all time, the
German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the following
amazing occurrence came close to destroying the element of
surprise. The Germans had managed by the middle of June through
grand efforts in misinformation, secrecy, and camouflage to have
concentrated near the Soviet border approximately 157 German
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divisions and more than half of the Luftwaffe. Thanks to German
deception and Soviet overconfidence, misreading of certain signs,
and the probability of offensive plans of the Soviets, the German
high command had achieved almost complete strategic and tactical
surprise when on 17 June 1941, German naval forces in the Baltic
began mine clearing operations in an act of almost incredible
miscoordination with the rest of the armed forces. The
operations were conducted in German waters off the East Prussian
coast and were unobtrusive. They were detected, nevertheless, by
Soviet naval forces in the Special Baltic Military District and
reported through the Soviet naval chain of command. Thanks
largely to a ponderous, fearful bureaucratic style of reporting
and passing information, the Soviet government did not receive
the single most unmistakeable piece of evidence of an impending
great offensive until it was too late to act. Although the
Soviets pride themselves on ruthless unification of strategy, the
difference in the naval environment of combat could well lead to
analogous faux pas by the Soviet armed forces in similar large
scale operations.
Ground Attack from a Standing Start:
Is There a Naval Version?
The Soviets could launch a ground offensive in a continental
TVD (TSMA) , for example, the Western, with only the forces in
place. Such an offensive could be described as an attack from a
standing start, and, although challenging for the Soviets, the
attack must be considered to be technically feasible. The Soviet
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Russians showed combat skills in the Great Patriotic War
—
battle stratagems, peasant cunning, infiltration, improvised
river crossings, etc. — that suggest natural tactical skills
favoring a surprise attack with forces in place. The Soviet
practice of army operational art with its emphasis on systematic
meticulous planning and check list style of applying the
principles of operational art, supports a view that the Soviets
would be perhaps uniquely capable of such action. On the other
hand, there are strong objections. In applying operational art
to an attack from a standing start, the Soviets would calculate
the correlation of forces. The Soviets have probably already
made this calculation and may have determined that with existing
balances an attack from a standing start is not a reasonable
alternative for a Soviet military operation in the Western TVD
(TSMA) . Even more importantly, the Soviets may actually believe
their own propaganda and not be prepared to launch a surprise
attack at all against an intact NATO coalition. In counterpoint
to these objections to a surprise attack, the Soviets probably
are reserving to themselves the option to react to perceived NATO
aggression with a preemptive attack which could take place no
matter how adverse the correlation of force to gain time for the
Soviets to save themselves from the postulated aggression.
Let us assume that the Soviets have plans to launch a
preemptive style offensive in the Western TVD (TSMA)
.
Notwithstanding the motives driving the Soviets to make such an
attack, motives that could be either naked, unprovoked aggression
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or "preemptive reaction" to perceived, impending NATO attack, the
Soviet offensive would be a real danger to the survival of NATO.
Within such a scenario of surprise attack, how would the Soviet
navy launch operations from an equivalent standing start in
support of the army through means of a unified set of naval
strategic missions and associated strategic military goals? Two
grand although straightforward possibilities for naval action
surface immediately. The Soviet navy is fundamentally a sea
denial instrument and would deny the Norwegian Sea to NATO naval
forces by defensively oriented "barrier" operations designed to
prevent the penetration of NATO submarines, carrier battle
groups, aviation, and landing forces. Alternatively, the Soviet
navy could carry out the same sea denial mission by offensively
oriented naval operations. In this case, the Soviets would take
advantage of surprise in the opening of a war by attacking the
more dangerous NATO naval forces, e.g., carriers and submarines,
in the Greenland-U.K. gap or concentrated and fixed in naval
forces. The key issue for the Soviets in the choice of how to
deny the Norwegian Sea to NATO naval forces would be the one of
self-confidence and skill in naval operational art.
For the Soviets, naval operational art pivots around
deception, surprise, and massing of strikes in fleet operations
and concentration of force in landings. This thesis is
overstated but probably correctly represents a Soviet
preoccupation with those principles. At the opening of a war
begun at their own initiative, it is difficult to believe that
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the Soviets would not do everything possible to exploit the
results of surprise. This line of reasoning supports a view that
the Soviets would launch offensively oriented naval operations in
the event of an army attack from a standing start in the Western
TVD (TSMA) . The Soviets, for example, instead of just effecting
a surge of naval forces from port areas of the Northern Fleet as
they have been observed to do in exercises, would superimpose on
the surge an additional set of engagements, strikes, and
maneuvers by naval forces already on station. This set of
actions by relatively weak naval forces on station would be the
real parallel of army forces "on station" or close up against
NATO ground forces in Central Europe. Unlike the Soviet Group of
Forces Germany that can remain independently in close proximity
to NATO ground forces, the Northern Fleet faces a naval
environment in which the entire fleet cannot stay on station at
sea indefinitely.
In the ocean environment, Soviet sea denial forces normally
on station in the vicinity of NATO sea control forces will be
relatively weaker than in the ground situation. On the ground,
powerful Soviet-dominated ground forces, superior in numbers of
personnel, tanks, artillery, and supporting aircraft, will be
normally located next to thinner NATO ground forces conveniently
fixed in position by the necessity to hold various terrain. In
attacking from an unreinforced, non-surge deployment, the Soviet
navy would face epic challenge in massing strikes effectively
against superior, maneuvering naval forces. The Soviets would be
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forced in this scenario to use surprise to compensate for the
disparity in strength. They would also have to show artistry in
applying the principle of coordination in naval operational art
to ensure that all assets — surface, submarine, and aviation
—
were factored into the surprise attack on NATO naval forces at
sea.
The Soviets would be forced to work hardest in the methods
of deception and the principle of surprise to expect important
let alone decisive results in a naval attack from a standing
start. Similarly to the scenario suggested earlier in this
report, the Soviets could achieve formidable results by attacking
fixed terrain of strategic naval importance in the North
Atlantic. Iceland is strategically located in the Greenland-U.K.
gap and has two additional features that make it almost uniquely
attractive for attack from the viewpoint of the skills and style
of thinking in Soviet naval operational art. Iceland is an
exceptionally large island in terms of being an island marked for
amphibious attack, and is virtually uninhabited by the standards
of Western Europe. 4 Iceland is an independent state having no
armed forces and not having allowed significant ground, naval, or
air defense installations on its soil. Using various deceptive
stratagems and imaginative operationally orchestrated tactics,
4 Iceland (39,800 sq mi) is virtually the same size as Luzon
(40,814 sq mi) in the Philippines, the largest land mass attacked
as a single island target in World War II, in contrast to
operations, for example, along the coast in this case, of New
Guinea. The population density in West Germany is roughly 625
persons per sq mi compared with 5 in Iceland.
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the Soviets should be able to seize Iceland almost immediately in
an attack from a standing start and thus reinforce the fleet
naval forces on station with a forward strategic pivot around
which to develop their operation.
Along with the master stratagem of seizing Iceland, the
Soviets have a vast array of ways to effect surprise and turn it
into victory in combat. The Soviets especially emphasize the
concept of diverse weapons as characterizing naval warfare today
and stemming from the revolution in the means of production in
the modern world. The Soviets note the impact of weapons
platforms and weapons such as naval aircraft, submarines, guided
missiles, torpedoes, and mines on naval warfare. In the west,
one of these weapons has had a tendency to be neglected because
of the sea control mentality of the traditionally important naval
services, for example, the United States and United Kingdom. The
weapon is the sea mine, and the Soviet navy, as a sea denial
force, has had contrasting tendencies that can be characterized
as placing greater emphasis on its employment. What are the
possibilities in this situation for tactical and technical
surprise on the part of the Soviet navy in conducting offensive
operations to take advantage of surprise at the beginning of a
war?
As a sea denial force, the Soviet navy has developed
technologically sophisticated mines for use against both surface
and submarine targets and others to be effective in shallow water
in defense against amphibious landings. In defense of the Arctic
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bastion, the Soviet navy has laid defensive mine fields to deny
access to the Barents Sea through passage evident from a general
study of maps of the area. The Soviet expertise in mines and
minefields for obvious defensive necessities includes intriguing
emphasis on the laying of mines from the air. With the Soviet
penchant for applying force with large numbers, we would suspect
that they have large numbers of naval aircraft capable of laying
mines. Under such a set of circumstances, we should be prepared
for technical and tactical surprise perhaps in the following
pattern: the laying of mines by Soviet naval aircraft amongst
NATO shipping in restricted maneuvering areas, e.g. , Norwegian
fjords, in order to force it out of certain operating areas and
into others. Finally, particularly at the beginning of a war,
and in the naval operation with the ACW mission in the Norwegian
Sea, the Soviets may already have conceptualized what might be
referred to as the blue water mine strike, the massed delivery by
air of mines capable of damaging NATO surface vessels in deep
water.
A Unique Technique for Understanding Soviet
Naval Operational Art
In this study, we have defined Soviet naval operational art,
described it in various ways, and attempted to show how it works
by means of scenarios. The scenarios illustrated the Soviet
style in applying the art to the planning and execution of the
naval operation. We attempted in the scenario to present things
through the minds of the Soviets according to their own thinking
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on naval operational art. We are not alone in this. The attempt
to understand Soviet ways of thinking have expanded over the
years and is one of the most important lines of defense analysis
taking place in the west at the present time. The activity
should be reinforced and must be continued. The attempt to be
Soviet is filled with wisdom but also with pitfall. Perhaps the
most important hazard is that Western Europeans and Americans can
only pretend to be Soviets; and, emigres and defectors will lack
the immediacy and responsibilities of the real thing to be fully
satisfying in compensating for our own foreign mentality vis-a-
vis Soviets in war games and scenarios. The result is that in
the most popular scenarios — those showing the Soviets attacking
and with Soviet style and motive so important — we must have
strong reservations about having adequately considered the
factors judged by the Soviets as being really important.
To overcome the pitfalls of pretending to be Soviet, to
understand at first hand the general factors and principles
operating in launching surprise attacks, we could play the game
of launching surprise naval attacks against the Soviets in
theaters in which we would have good reason to fear the reverse.
Understanding that these scenarios would have the purpose to
force us to consider at first hand from the viewpoint of an
attacker, the general range of factors and principles for
consideration, we could justify them as (1) prudent, and (2)
capable of leading to insights that would never be reached by any
other way and could be essential to our survival. As concerns
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the understanding of Soviet naval operational art, the
application of U.S. naval strategy and tactics by Americans to
the fundamental problems of surprise attack would be indirect but
capable of extrapolation of lesson from one (American) to the
other (Soviet)
.
Both Americans and Soviets agree, for example, that the same
processes or regularities — command and control, reconnaissance,
massing of strikes, and preservation of force — exist in the
conduct of naval warfare. 5 They also agree that similar
principles of action apply and that the most important are
identical. By playing the game of Americans attacking, we would
be forced to consider with the special immediacy of planning and
conducting our own attack, the same general processes and
principles necessary for the Soviets to consider. The great
advance possible in the technique would be the complete authority
with which we could say: here are the dangers and opportunities
for us in launching surprise naval attacks in a given area. With
the resulting special insight of one attacker into the mentality
of the other, we would be able to focus on understanding Soviet
style in naval operational art by statement-questions as follows:
we know that adequate reconnaissance in a given form is necessary
5See the inciteful comments in Lieutenant John R. Hafey,
"The Soviet Art of Naval Warfare at the Operational Strategical
Level," Course Paper, NS-3452, Naval Postgraduate School, 14
December 1987, pp. 4-6 including Figure 2. See also, Captain
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN, Retired, Fleet Tactics . Theory and
Practice (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute, 1986), p. 38, and
"Learn to Fight in a Modern Way," Morskov Sbornik . No. 9, 1986,
p. 8.
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to achieve surprise against a target sited fairly deeply in the
enemy side of the zone of operations; would Soviet naval
operational art filter out the same factor as important and if





SEARCHING FOR NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART:
IDEAS DERIVED FROM RECENT SOVIET BOOKS ON THE NAVY
Yet another way to get at Soviet naval operational art is to
examine what the Soviets say about naval subjects in recent books
as yet untranslated. The special concept used in this study
involved a technique that might be termed "the dialogue." In
this technique a tactical-technical expert on the subject of
Soviet naval warfare links up with a linguist fluent in Russian
and with a first-hand knowledge of the Soviet mentality. The
tactical-technical expert is the leading person in the dialogue;
he knows what he is looking for; he needs the assistance of the
Soviet oriented, Russian linguist to get at it. In this study
the tactical-technical expert was searching for Soviet naval
operational art. He provided his cooperating Russian linguists
qua Soviet experts with books on subjects like cooperation of
army and navy and the performance of the Soviet navy in the Great
Fatherland War. Once the surrogate Soviets completed their
reading — essentially a translation of the material — the
tactical-technical expert orchestrated a dialogue in which he
received the translation paraphrased in general terms orally by
the linguists qua Soviet experts and systematically discussed the
application of the material to a better understanding of Soviet
naval operational art.
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In a recent (1983) book on the "cooperation of army and
navy," the Soviet author writes on a subject of considerable
naval interest with distracting generality. 1 He poses no
question, no propositions. It is not clear what the issue is.
It is clear that he consider that cooperation is important
between army and navy. As concerns naval art and particularly
naval operational art, it became clear that the Soviet author is
focusing on the operational-strategical level of war and makes
valuable statements concerning the origin of operations. The
Soviet author, who can probably also be referred to as "the
Soviets" because of his rank typical in this type of writing and
innocuous, general approach, goes on to state that the essence of
the modern naval operation is coordination because of the growing
scope of war. In addition to the consistent theme of
conscription and expanding forces of production, the author goes
on to emphasize that modern war is conducted in four environments
and thus coordination is the special service provided by
operational art. This is a revealing theme. It shows the
Soviets struggling with problems of command and control in modern
war. It supports a view that they have found it both natural and
necessary to insert another element of control into war
intermediate between tactics and strategy.
The Soviet author emphasizes the importance of the conduct
of modern war in four environments (land, sea, air, and space) in
^Captain 1st Rank, Reserve, L.I. 01 'shtynskiy, Cooperation
of Armv and Naw (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1983)
.
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a way that triggered the working of the dialogue between the
technical and Soviet experts. He grandly states an obvious,
almost philosophical generality. Those in the west not familiar
with the Soviet style of writing would consider such a statement
to represent a boring, almost sophomoric style and not useful for
understanding the modern military operation. The Soviets,
however, are pedantic, high level, scientific formal izers. When
they say that modern war is conducted in four environments they
intend that the general, central point extends down to and be
used as a guide to the conduct of the military operation. In a
word, in the dialogue, the technical expert and special Russian
linguist knew that the Soviet author was stating a scientific
point of great importance, namely, that the modern military
operation has been created by the necessity for increased
coordination as exemplified by combat or combat support in four
environments. For the Soviets coordination is a scientifically
formal necessity of the (scientifically formal) military
operation.
But how do these general statements with the meaning
indicated above help us to understand the naval operational and
distinguish it from other military operations? The dialogue
could see that within the framework presented by the Soviet
author that naval warfare holds a unique position making
coordination in naval warfare more challenging and more important
than in any of the other services at present. The army operation
will demand, for example, operations on the ground and with air
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support and qualifies for conducting operations in two
environments with the addition of combat support from
communications satellites in yet a third environment. The navy
operation can demand operations undersea (inner space or under
air)
,
on the surface, in the air, as dictated by land in the
landing operation, and in space as concerns combat support by
space satellite. This formidable list of naval environments does
not even include the implication of potential future operations
on the ocean floor and undersea mountain ranges of the world by
submarine forces which could well hold undersea terrain similarly
to the way ground terrain is held by ground forces today. For
purposes of understanding the Soviet naval operation and naval
operational art, the dialogue concluded as follows: Soviet naval
operational art, based on the fundamentals of the operating
environment, would have a greater necessity to take account of
the "scientific" necessities of coordination than any of the
other services. In contrasting army operational art with naval,
the dialogue suggests that naval operational art is army
operational art with the scientific-historical principle of
coordination exaggerated in importance in the case of the navy.
The Soviet author uses a historical approach in analyzing
army and navy cooperation and presents examples of operational-
strategical interest that are considerably different from those
chosen in the west. The Soviets chose Norway, for example, in
April-June 1940, as an important example of army-navy cooperation
in war. In sharp contrast, western writers have a tendency to
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focus their attention on the period from late 1942 to the end of
the war — the period of allied recovery and strategic
offensive — to ignore Norway outright, and to give relatively
limited attention to the lessons of the great Japanese offensive
operations in 1941-1942. The Soviets have a special fascination
for the Norwegian Campaign which they identify as the first great
joint strategic operation of World War II. The dialogue fastened
on this point because of the bland assurance with which the
Soviet author makes his generalizations. The dialogue sensed
that the Soviets are telling us a lot about their style of
thinking and the factors that are important to them. The dialogue
concluded that the Soviets are wrestling in the case of the
Norwegian Campaign with a disturbing reality that runs counter to
their almost unlimited confidence in correlation of forces as the
key to success in war. The Soviets point out in Norway that the
Germans with weak forces and imperfect cooperation nonetheless
won, like it or not, through the bold exploitation of surprise.
As concerns naval operational art, the Soviet author is warning
his readers that surprise on the strategic defensive and the
unique Soviet principle of readiness on the potential strategic
defensive may override all principles in importance at the
beginning of blitz-style military or naval operations.
The Soviet author shows even more interest in the great
Japanese naval offensive operations of 1941-1942. He is
fascinated by the spatial scope of the Japanese naval operations
and a boldness that was similar in quality to that of the Germans
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in Norway. In the grand, unprecedented naval blitz of those
years, the Japanese conducted several naval operations with
distant targets in the vast space of the largest TV (Theater of
War, or TW) in the history of warfare. The Soviet author notes
that the Japanese required "perfect planning" to achieve victory
in this opening strategic offensive. He goes on to emphasize the
special importance of surprise and the "big strikes" at the
beginning of the war. The Soviet author attaches special
importance to the point that the first strikes were delivered in
"every strategic direction," i.e., virtually simultaneously along
the mean axis in every TVD (TSMA) of the entire TV (TW). 2 The
Soviet author is visibly impressed by the skill of Japanese naval
and naval operational art in coordinating surprise and massing of
strikes among several TVDs (TSMAs) . The dialogue was stimulated
to conclude that the Soviets are warning their own armed forces
of the tremendous potential of surprise attack.
The Soviet authority continues on to describe the weaknesses
of Japanese plans in 1941-42, presenting more opportunities for
the dialogue experts to put together factors that the Soviets
consider important in naval operational art. In criticizing
Japanese plans, he notes that they depended too much on the
weakness of the opposing allied forces and the achievement of
complete surprise. The authority makes the point that "the
Anglo-Americans" had no large ground forces in the Pacific and
201 'shtynskiy, Cooperation Army Navy , p. 51.
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little sea lift capability for the modest forces there.
Continuing in this vein, he makes two very different points using
the same picture of surprise attack at the beginning of a war.
The authority comments that the Japanese had no fall-back plans
for army-navy cooperation in case of the failure of surprise.
The dialogue sensed here that the Soviets are warning themselves
as part of their own naval operational art to hold back an
effective operational-strategic reserve. One of the principles
of Soviet naval operational art is the reconstitution of reserves
and the authority seems to be using the vast Japanese historical
example to illustrate the principle.
The authority then makes an argument in a rather different
direction. He notes that the thin deployment of allied ground
forces in the Pacific allowed the Japanese to pace the Pacific
blitz to the operations of very strong naval forces and
relatively weak army formations. Depending almost overwhelmingly
on surprise and the initial weakness of the allies, the Japanese
advances on the main strategic axes had to be fast. Those
advances were along naval strategic axes and were favored by the
accompanying relatively small Japanese ground forces strong
enough to seize key naval targets but small enough to contribute
to a blitz tempo of the predominating naval operations. The
dialogue began to suspect here, that the Soviet authority was
suggesting that the normal rules and ratios of correlation of
forces may not apply in the opening stages of a blitz war. The
suspicions of the dialogue were strengthened as the authority
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went on to note that later in the war the naval dominated
American forces in the Pacific depended on excessive forces and
means characterized by almost outlandish air supremacy. The
Soviet author claims that operational-strategic opportunities
were missed by the Americans as a result of their insistence on
extreme force ratios. At this point, the dialogue observed a
coherent picture in which the Soviet naval authority had said
that in the opening stages of a great blitz surprise allows
boldly led modestly sized forces to achieve victory in defiance
of normally demanded force ratios. The subtlety in understanding
Japanese success and applying it to estimating the possibilities
of Soviet success in an opening blitz, is that as weak as
Japanese forces often were, they were strong enough in supporting
aviation and naval gunfire to win against he allied forces that
mobility and surprise allowed them to concentrate against.
There are some ironies that can be observed at this point in
the discussions of the Soviet authority. Joseph Stalin has been
noted as commenting on the crucial factor of development and
production of war materiel that the good enough is forever the
enemy of the even better. Stalin made this comment early in the
Great Fatherland War and not surprisingly the Soviets adhered to
the principle being expressed. Although Stalin was demanding
large quantities of weapons in this statement, he was stating
perhaps even more emphatically the need for immediate decisive
results. We could take Stalin's statement and criticize the
operational style of the strategic offensive in the Great
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Fatherland War and Soviet emphasis today on perhaps overly
favorable correlations of force to win in war. As concerns
Soviet military operational art today, the Soviets may be doing
some surprising reevaluations of correlation of forces based on
observations of the Japanese and Germans in 1941-42 and
characterized by the application of lesser force ratios
counterbalanced by the effects of deception, surprise, and
coordination. In the case of naval operational art, we would
expect emphasis on the importance of deception, surprise, and
coordination exaggerated over that in army operational art and
involving "uncharacteristically" bold naval operations at the
beginning of surprise offensive operations.
The Soviet author makes at least one more point that
reinforces the arguments above. He describes U.S. naval
operations in the period of the strategic offensives of 1943-45
as being conducted against much stronger resistance than that
faced by the Japanese in 1941-42. He elaborates by noting that
the U.S. navy had to employ relatively much stronger carrier
aviation forces and amphibious forces in its strategic offensives
than the Japanese earlier. Then, arguing from the later American
experience he contrasts it once again with the Japanese by noting
that the greater the surprise that can be achieved in a naval
operation the less the need for the exaggerated air supremacy
that characterizes the well-known American part of the war in the
Pacific particularly in 1944-45.
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Finally, toward the end of the work, the Soviet authority
makes somewhat startling comments about the current Soviet navy's
role on the maritime flanks of the army. AFter some uninspired
truisms to the effect that operational-tactical cooperation
between army and navy should be close and that naval combat
should take place to the full depth of the opposing enemy forces,
the author begins to discuss the navy's time-honored strategic
mission to interfere with enemy SLOCs and secure the maritime
flanks of the army. The author appears to be in process of
restating another conservative truism that the Soviet navy
secures the maritime flanks of the army and interferes with the
coastal SLOCs of the enemy, e.g., as in the Baltic, 1944-45. The
expected truism does not develop, though, with the Soviet author
commenting that interfering with enemy SLOCs and protection of
the flanks of the ground forces gives the Soviet navy a new
mission to obtain maritime supremacy. The dialogue interpreted
this line of argument as signalling new possibilities for Soviet
naval warfare in which the usual aggressive contention in a sea
denial mode with a strong enemy, e.g., the Germans in the Baltic,
is replaced by something really new. The experts conducting the
dialogue sensed that the Soviet navy is still an oceanic sea
denial force but may already have become a maritime flank, sea
control force. If such is the case, the Soviets can be counted
on to fight for sea control in the blue water of the Norwegian
Sea — the great northern maritime flank of the Soviet forces in
Western Europe.
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For the Soviets, the Great Fatherland War continues to be a
measure of both accomplishment then (1941-45) and change and
contrast now (1988) . In a fairly recent (1980) book, the Soviet
author presents a succinct and coherent picture of the Soviet
navy in the War while pursuing the central theme of its
operational-strategic use. 3 The book contains less of the
ideological baggage, e.g., references to Marxism-Leninism and
innocuous overgeneralization to avoid ideological error, than is
found so often in Soviet military history. For readers who are
familiar with the naval campaigns in the Atlantic, Pacific, and
Mediterranean in World War II, the book must be jarring. The
Soviet author unwittingly makes a case for those who know the
scale of action and the impact of naval warfare in other
theaters, that Soviet naval warfare contributed only minor
effects in the War. This is true for a variety of reasons, some
having little to do with the Soviet navy itself and in spite of
the impressive Soviet production effort in creating the largest
submarine fleet in the world by 1939.
The Soviet authority presents the view that the Soviet Union
faced potential war against a strong capitalist coalition in the
1920s and 1930s. Soviet weaknesses were compounded by the defeat
of Imperial Russia in the war by late 1917 and the allied
intervention in peripheral maritime areas in the Black Sea, the
Barents Sea, and at Vladivostock in the Far East. The Russian
3The author and book: A.B. Vasov, The Fleet in the Great
Fatherland War . 1941 - 1945 . The Experience of Operational
Strategic Use (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, Nawka, 1980)
.
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defeat by the Germans and intervention by the allies was
reflected in heavy losses in ships, damage to bases, and loss of
bases and arsenals, for example, in the Baltic. Russia collapsed
as a naval power in the period 1917-1921 and Soviet Russian began
life with feeble naval forces. The British, for example, for a
hundred years before this time, had had a consistent policy of
closed Turkish Straits aimed at keeping a strong Imperial Black
Sea fleet from entering the Mediterranean. In 1923, in a
dramatic reversal of policy at Lausanne, the British agreed to
the partial opening of the Straits reflecting the extraordinary
naval weakness of the Soviet Russians in the Black Sea and
elsewhere. With the Imperial Russian fleet having melted away,
the Soviets faced a nightmare capitalist coalition of the United
States, Britain, Japan, and France, each with a powerful fleet of
its own.
The Soviet authority describes the development of a "small
war" strategy for the navy to defend against a coalition
anticipated to be so strong that a similarly styled Soviet navy
was out of the question to develop. 4 The Soviets considered that
mass ground armies would dominate a war in extended battles
involving deep maneuvers. The navy would have the mission to
defend the maritime flanks of the Soviet ground armies. The
Soviets realized that the navy could not be allotted the
resources to build the vast surface ship fleet necessary to
challenge the capitalist coalition in blue water. The Soviet
4 Ibid., p. 43.
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navy could not win big naval battles on blue water against the
capitalist surface fleets. The author states that without
sufficient forces to conduct operations in the open seas, the
Soviet navy was forced to concentrate on strikes on the inshore
zone. The Soviet navy developed relatively small coastal-type
submarines, mines, coastal artillery, and land-based naval
aviation to conduct the anticipated offshore naval acts. The
Soviets envisioned the naval war as one in which inferior Soviet
naval forces would conduct successful naval operations in gray
water on the maritime flanks of the army.
The Soviet authority describes the Soviet naval operation
under a small war strategy as being either independent or joint.
The most important independent naval operation decided upon by
the navy was against the maritime communications of the enemy.
The most important joint operations were landing operations and
coastal defense operations in coastal areas on the maritime
flanks of the army. The picture is one of enormous realism and
conservatism on the part of the Soviets. With characteristic
energy and focus on numbers, they managed to equip themselves
with more than 225 coastal-style submarines by the eve of World
War II, parallel quantities of mines, and a surprising amount of
naval aviation. How does naval operational art fit into this
picture? The Soviets describe naval operational art as dominated
by the skills required (1) to find and attack the enemy, and (2)
to inflict powerful blows of the different branches of the navy. 5
5Ibid., p. 22.
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From a slightly different viewpoint, the Soviets also describe
that the "essence" of the small war strategy was the skill in
naval operational art of inflicting short, decisive strikes with
a variety of naval forces. In the context of the presentation,
these strikes would be both in independent operations against
enemy sea communications and joint operations with the army in
landings and defense and attack of naval bases and arsenals in
the coastal areas.
In spite of effective thinking about the realistic
development of the navy in the 1920s and 1930s and an effective
strategy for its employment, the Soviet authority makes it clear
that a whole series of deficiencies was revealed in the theory of
naval art in the opening stages of the Great Fatherland War. He
makes an especially interesting point for potential application
to the Northeast Atlantic today that naval raids were not
examined against enemy bases or communications. At the beginning
of the Great Fatherland War, the Soviets had placed their
strongest fleet in the Baltic. Perhaps the most telling
commentary on the style and effectiveness of the Soviet navy can
be found in the use of this force. This powerful fleet allowed
itself to be bottled up in the Gulf of Finland by relatively weak
German naval and air forces. It suffered heavy losses through
aerial attack culminating in the sinking of the battleship,
October Revolution, by a three-aircraft attacking flight of
German dive bombers, one of which sunk the vessel with a single
large bomb. As the relatively weak German forces in Army Group
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North (e.g., the overall ratio ground forces, German-Soviet, was
approximately 1:1) closed in around Leningrad in the period July-
September 1941, the Soviets committed approximately 87,000
"sailors" to the defense of the city as ground infantry and
artillery. 6 In contrast, although also under different strategic
circumstances, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet supported unsuccessful
but extended sieges at Odessa and Sevastopol, a bold and
effective landing at Kerch and Feodosiya (December 1941-January
1942) , and a successful defense of Novorossisk.
As the Soviets shifted entirely to the strategic offensive
by late 1943, the navy began to conduct independent fleet
operations against German grey water SLOCs in the Black, Baltic,
and Barents Seas. These modest operations against severely
weakened German air, ground, and naval forces are the grandfather
of the present-day Soviet independent naval operation associated
with the strategic naval missions of disruption of NATO SLOCs,
ACW, A-AAW, and destruction of missile submarines. The
independent naval operation demanded changes in the methods of
commanding and controlling naval operations. The Soviet author
elaborates on the changes in the style of command showing
historical precedents that are potentially valuable for
understanding how the Soviets would command both independent and
joint operations today. In the period of the strategic defensive
the Soviet land fronts successfully controlled joint operations
through strong naval staff groups at front headquarters. As the
6Ibid., p. 148.
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Soviets moved into the period of the strategic offensive, they
effected a new style that is a potential valuable forecast of how
they would command in a surprise Soviet strategic offensive or
"counteroffensive" at the beginning of an extended conventional
war today. The Soviets almost instinctively shifted command up
the line, high as possible, into the Stavka itself which in turn
used as its working organs the People's Commissariat of the Navy
and the Main Navy Staff to direct the fleets in naval operations
independent of the great fronts. Here we have historical
precedent for the naval fleet headquarters to apply the skill of
naval operational art to offensively oriented naval operations
unified with the overall military situation through the main
naval staff into the General Staff and Stavka-VGK.
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CHAPTER TEN
SUMMARY, OBSERVATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
There is a Soviet naval operational art. It is real. The
Soviets are in deadly earnest about it. The chapters of this
study have pieced together a picture that is summarized below.
For the sake of succinctness and consistency, each point is
presented in terms of the direction from which Soviet naval
operational art was approached:
From the Viewpoint of the Soviet Navy:
Soviet naval operational art is the scientific skill of
planning and conducting the aggregate of simultaneous and
successive engagements, strikes, and maneuvers of naval forces,
coordinated and interrelated by objective, mission, place, and
time for purposes of repelling an aggressor in ocean and sea TVDs
(TSMAs) , often to accomplish operational-strategic or operational
missions in coordination with forces of other branches of the
armed forces.
From the Viewpoint of Soviet Military Science:
Soviet military science is the system of knowledge dealing
with the nature and laws of war, the preparation of the armed
forces and the country for war, and the methods of waging it.
The most important component of military science is Soviet
military art which in turn includes Soviet military strategy.
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For the Soviets, there is only one unified Soviet military
strategy and it plays the leading role in the theory of the navy,
the included theory of naval art, and the strategic employment of
the navy. Soviet military strategy defines the tasks and the
methods of Soviet naval operational art through the intermedi-
aries of the theory of the navy and the theory of naval art.
From the Viewpoint of an Unfriendly Western Critic:
Soviet naval operational art is a Soviet naval strategic
skill based on an ideologically driven, pseudo-scientific, highly
systematic, pedantic, formalism claiming to assure the
achievement of military strategic goals in TVDs (TSMAs) in time
of war.
From the Viewpoint of a U.S. Naval Officer's Master's Level
Thesis:
Soviet naval operational art is the Soviet naval skill of
preparing and executing a naval operational plan — a plan
designed to achieve strategic military goals in a TVD (TSMA)
.
In planning the naval operation, the Soviet naval commander
and staff practice operational art by constructing on paper the
tactical engagements, strikes, and maneuvers that sequentially or
simultaneously are required to achieve centrally directed,
unified strategic goals.
In executing the naval operation, the Soviet naval commander
and staff practice operational art by stringing together the
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multiple tactical engagements strikes, and maneuvers required by
modern large navies to achieve strategic military goals.
From the Viewpoint of Science:
For the Soviets, naval operational art is derived from the
Marxist-Leninist world historical, scientific dialectic (or,
logic) which the Soviets claim presents scientific logic superior
to any other for the understanding of world history and the
included phenomenon of war.
From the Viewpoint of Modern History:
Modern forces of production and conscription have combined
to create a new form of fleet combat activity — the naval
operation. Soviet naval operational art developed as the skill
of preparing for and conducting the independent naval operation,
and, especially in coastal waters, the combined operation with
other branches of the armed forces.
From the Viewpoint of Metaphor (Soviet naval operational art is
noted for useful purpose to be something that characterizes it to
some degree but with which it is not completely interchangeable.
The overstated characterization is effective in sorting out the
high points of naval operational art)
:
Soviet naval operational art (SNOA) is Soviet Russian
mentality (i.e., characteristic of mind), or, alternately,
SNOA is a Soviet Russian style of thinking.
SNOA is Soviet social science applied to armed warfare.
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SNOA is a layer of Soviet political, bureaucratically styled
control
.
SNOA is Soviet Russian military paternalism.
SNOA is Soviet Russian pedantic formalism.
SNOA is Socialist realism (i.e., a kind of neo-classicism in
which certain things must be observed)
.
SNOA is Soviet military science.
SNOA is severely centralized and unified Soviet military
strategy.
SNOA is the modern Soviet military operation.
SNOA is the Soviet naval operation.
SNOA is the plan to accomplish Soviet naval strategic missions
through Soviet naval tactics.
SNOA is the link between Soviet naval strategic missions and
Soviet naval tactics.
SNOA is the link between Soviet Military strategy and Soviet
naval tactics.
SNOA is modern history.
SNOA is Soviet naval history (i.e., Soviet empirical experience
of war)
SNOA is the Kerch-Feodosiya joint landing operation (December
1941-January 1942)
.
SNOA is the independent Soviet naval operation against German
SLOCs in the Baltic (1944-45).
SNOA is cunning and operational camouflage applied to the
achievement of surprise.
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SNOA is deception and surprise in the Soviet naval operation.
SNOA is the preemptive, surprise massed strike of naval fires
against the strongest enemy fleet targets.
SNOA is the establishment of correlations of forces adequate
enough to achieve the strategic goals of the naval operation.
SNOA is the coordination of engagements, strikes, and maneuvers
in an oceanic or maritime TVD (TSMA) to accomplish naval
strategic missions.
SNOA (on the strategic offensive) is deception, surprise, and
preemptive massing of strikes.
SNOA (on the military strategic offensive but the naval strategic
defensive) is deception, surprise, preemptive massing of
strikes and willingness to absorb casualties and damage.
SNOA (on the strategic defensive) is readiness and preservation
of reserve.
SNOA is Soviet army operational art applied at sea.
SNOA is Soviet army operational art exaggerated in every
principle of the art.
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SIX METHODS TO ACCOMPLISH SURPRISE





3 Concealment of preparation
4. Use of new weapons or tactics
5. Choice of time and axis of
attack
6. Speed of maneuver or
decisiveness of action
ELEVEN GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF SOVIET MILITARY ART
1. Readiness
2. Surprise (& initiative)
3. Use of all assets
4 Coordination
5. Concentration on main
axis
6. Defeat of enemy in full
depth of his deployment
7. Calculation & application
of political-moral
factors
8. Continuous troop control
9. Ongoing resolution of
emerging problems
10. Complete continuous rear
support
11. Timely restoration of
reserve
SEVEN SPECIFIC FEATURES THAT

















of action, feints are of
increased importance)
Diversity of methods (use of
mixed forces)
Electronic warfare (the
material base of modern
weapons is electronic)
* V. Alekseyev, "Characteristic Features of Contemporary Naval
Battles," Morskov Sbornik . No. 10, 1986, pp. 17-21.
APPENDIX ONE
VARIOUS FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONAL ART
A-l
FOUR PROCESSES THAT DETERMINE
OUTCOME OF COMBAT AT SEA*
1. Quantity and quality of
weapons






along the weakest path
of resistance
4 . Preservation of force
SEVEN STRATEGIC MISSIONS OF SOVIET










Defend Soviet SLOCs and bases
Defeat enemy naval forces in
closed & open seas and ocean
areas contiguous with coasts
Destroy enemy land targets
Destroy enemy carrier
groupings
Destroy enemy ASW forces
Destroy enemy missile
submarines
SAVKIN: SEVEN GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES OF OPERATIONAL ART
(C. 1959)**
1. Mobility




5. Preservation of combat
effectiveness




* "Learn to Fight in a
Modern Way , " Morskoy
Sbornik . No. 9 . 1986,
p. 8.
** V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic
Principles of Soviet
Operational Art and Tac-
tics (A Soviet View )
,
(Moscow, 1972), Tr by US
Air Force, p. 115.
*** K. Stalbo, "Some Issues
of the Theory of the
Development and Employment
of the Navy," Morskoy
Sbornik . No. 4, 1981.










Offensive naval actions at sea
do not attempt to seize
terrain (except landing and
antHanding operations)
Defensive naval actions often
do not have purpose to hold
terrain
In naval warfare, objectives
are achieved by attack
against the strongest
targets
In naval warfare, deployment
and redeployment may take
weeks
The scope of naval operations
may easily be global
The Navy conducts armed war-
fare in four terrain media
(sea, undersea, land, air)
Fleets employ extraordinarily
diverse weapons
Some naval forces are severely
constrained by weather
(Stolfi Addendum) In naval
warfare deployment for war
and redeployment in war
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